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COMMENT
LETTERS OF CREDIT: CURRENT THEORIES AND
USAGES
The letter of credit is no longer a financial tool available
only to merchants dealing in international trade, nor is it a
service which only the largest New York lending institutions
can offer; rather the letter of credit is becoming an increasingly
important element of our daily financial lives. Letters of credit
issue from banks and other lending institutions in the largest
metropolitan centers as well as the smaller rural communities.
The use of this financial tool seems limited only by the creativ-
ity of man.
Commercial Letters of Credit'
As the letter of credit first developed,2 its use was limited
1. This section of this comment will deal primarily with the documentary credit
and primarily with its use in sale-of-goods transactions. However, it should be noted
that two other common forms of commercial credits are the "clean" credit and the
"notation" credit. The "clean" credit is a letter of credit which obligates the issuer to
pay merely upon presentment of a draft or demand to pay without requiring any other
accompanying documentation. See Fair Pavillions, Inc. v. First Nat'l City Bank, 19
N.Y.2d 512, 227 N.E.2d 839, 281 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1967); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 606 (1972). A "notation" credit
is a letter of credit which states as one of its terms that any person who purchases or
pays drafts drawn or demands for payment under the credit must make a notation of
the amount of the draft or demand on the letter itself, usually in appropriate spaces
and columns provided on the reverse of the- letter of credit. U.C.C. § 5-108 (1972
version). See also 5 M. BENDER U.C.C. SERVICES, F. HART & W. WILLIER, FORMS AND
PROCEDURES 51.02 (1977). U.C.C. § 5-108 was adopted verbatim in LA. R.S. 10:5-108
(Supp. 1974).
An interesting comparison between certain three-party credit card transactions,
like VISA or MASTERCHARGE purchases can be drawn with the letter of credit,
particularly a notation credit. In both instances the transaction involves three separate
parties and three independent contracts or engagements. The function of the credit
card or the letter of credit is to substitute the credit of a known solvent party, the bank,
for the credit of the purchaser. Trade is facilitated in both instances. Both the notation
credit and the credit card have certain established limits of credit which may not be
exceeded; in both, the obligation of the credit-issuer and the card-issuer to pay the
seller is independent of the contract between the issuer and its customer for reimburse-
ment. Although the analogy falls short in certain areas, the similarities are striking and
the analogy should provide a familiar concept to facilitate the reader's understanding.
See B. CLARK & A. SQUILLANTE, THE LAW OF BANK DEPOSITS, COLLECTIONS AND CREDIT
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to its primary or payment function.' Since the turn of the nine-
teenth century, however, the letter of credit has served an in-
creasingly important secondary or financing function.' Broadly
speaking, the payment function of a letter of credit is accom-
plished through the commercial letter of credit,' which is also
referred to as a documentary credit.' The financing function of
the letter of credit, from the customer's standpoint, is accom-
plished by the issuance of a letter of credit calling for an ac-
ceptance of the beneficiary's draft upon presentation of the
required documents. From the beneficiary's standpoint, fi-
nancing is accomplished through the use of transferable letters
of credit and back-to-back letters of credit.'
A letter of credit is an unconditional promise to pay the
draft or demand for payment of the beneficiary if the docu-
ments accompanying the draft comply with the terms of the
CARDS 191-92 (1970); Davenport, Bank Credit Cards and the Uniform Commercial
Code, 85 BANKING L.J. 941, 948 (1968).
2. An in-depth historical study of the development of letters of credit is beyond
the scope of this comment; however, excellent historical treatment can be found in B.
KOZOLCHYK, COMMERCIAL LETTERS OF CREDIT IN THE AMERICAS (1966) and Comment,
Commercial Letters of Credit: Development and Expanded Use in Modern Commer-
cial Transactions, 4 CuM.-SAM. L. REV. 134 (1973).
3. Joseph, Letters of Credit: The Developing Concepts and Financing Functions,
94 BANKING L.J. 816-18 (1977).
Article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code governs letters of credit. By 1974 La.
Acts, No. 92, § 1, adding LA. R.S. 10:5-101-17, Louisiana adopted article 5 of the
U.C.C. with very few changes.
4. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 605; Comment, supra note 2, at
140.
5. Actually, the payment function is performed when the terms of the letter of
credit are such that the draft or demand for payment is paid on sight when accompa-
nied by complying documents. If the draft is a time draft, i.e., payment is to be made
within a specified number of days following receipt of the draft and complying docu-
ments, then as to the account party (see text at note 11, infra) the letter of credit
performs a financing function, as he has a certain amount of time before he has to
provide reimbursement to the issuer.
6. Joseph, supra note 3, at 816-17. Among the people in the trade a letter of credit
is often referred to as a credit, while the term documentary credit is used to describe
any letter of credit where payment will be made only when certain specified documents
are presented with the demand for payment, and when payment will be made only if
the documents conform to the precise terms of the letter of credit. Id. at 817-18. Thus
the UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND PRACTICE FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDITS (1974 Revision) by the
International Chamber of Commerce refers to a "credit" or "documentary credit,"
while article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code (1972 version) and LA. R.S. title 10,
chapter 5, refer to documentary letters of credit as simply "credits."
7. See text at note 95, infra.
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credit.' Actually, compliance with a few formal requirements
will establish a document as a letter of credit. The document
must be in writing9 and signed by the issuer.'0 A credit which
is issued by a bank or another person and states conspicuously
on the document that it is a "Letter of Credit" will be consid-
ered a letter of credit." Furthermore, even if the document does
not state that it is a letter of credit, if it is issued by a bank
and requires a draft or demand for payment to be accompanied
by specified documents, the document falls within the statu-
tory definition of a letter of credit.'2 Similarly, if the credit is
issued by a person other than a bank and requires the draft or
demand for payment to be accompanied by documents of title,
it too is legislatively deemed a letter of credit. 3
The typical documentary credit in a sale-of-goods transac-
tion involves basically three parties: the customer, known as
the account party, who requests that a letter of credit be issued
or "opened"; the issuer, typically a bank which at the cus-
tomer's request opens a letter of credit; and the beneficiary,
who is the person entitled to draft or demand payment under
the credit.
The relationship among the various parties in a letter of
credit transaction is illustrated by the following example. Sup-
pose that a Louisiana merchant, B, decides that his spring line
8. The letter of credit concept has been defined in many ways. It has been
defined as "a formal promise by a bank or another party of known solvency to accept
and pay, or just to pay, the draft or the demand for payment by a beneficiary, whose
compliance with the terms of the credit is a prerequisite of the enforceability of the
promise." B. KOZOLCHYK, supra note 2, at 9.
9. U.C.C. § 5-104 (1972 version); LA. R.S. 10:5-104 (Supp. 1974). Hereafter only
the citation to the Uniform Commercial Code will be given. The Louisiana Revised
Statute which corresponds to the U.C.C. section will be found in title 10, under the
same section number.
10. U.C.C. § 5-104 (1972 version).
11. U.C.C. § 5-102(I)(c) (1972 version).
12. U.C.C. § 5-102(1)(a) (1972 version). A national bank may issue any letter of
credit permissible under article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code or the Uniform
Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits subject to certain additional restric-
tions imposed by the Comptroller of the Currency for safe and sound banking practice.
12 C.F.R. § 7.7016 (1978); see also text at note 134, infra.
13. U.C.C. § 5-102(1)(b) (1972 version). Actually there is no sound basis for the
definition in 5-102(1)(b) that "documents of title" accompany a draft or demand for
payment if a letter of credit is issued by one other than a bank. The language is
understandable in the sale-of-goods transaction, but in other areas, such as standby
letters of credit, there seems to be no reason for limiting the definition.
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of goods should contain some sandals which are manufactured
in Japan. B contacts the Japanese seller, S, proposing the pur-
chase of a specified number of sandals. B says nothing about
payment in his proposal. Since S knows nothing about B's
solvency or ability to pay, S does not want to sell his sandals
on open account, but instead suggests that B pay in advance.
B is not willing to pay in advance for goods which he has not
seen, so B suggests a letter of credit sale. 4 S will stipulate that
14. It is immaterial whether the buyer or seller first suggests the use of a letter
of credit. The situation postulated in the text is not the only instance in which a letter
of credit might be introduced into a transaction. Frequently a buyer who could pay
cash in advance will seek a letter of credit in order to draw upon the vast reservoir of
knowledge and experience which a competent letter of credit department will possess.
The members of the letter of credit department can confer with the account party,
usually in person, in order to determine the myriad of issues and questions which could
arise in a complex sale-of-goods transaction. Listed below are just a few of the many
issues which will be resolved. Bear in mind that the issuer will not honor a presented
draft or demand for payment unless the accompanying documents conform verbatim
to the terms of the credit.
1) Will the account party accept only full shipments, or are partial shipments
permitted?
2) What is the latest shipment date which will be accepted?
3-) Is transshipment allowed? If transshipment is not allowed then the vessel
upon which the goods are shipped from the point of origin must be the vessel which
delivers the goods to the point of destination. Thus if transshipment is not allowed, a
shipment of goods from port X in Spain to New Orleans, must arrrive at New Orleans
on the ship which originally left port X. In the foregoing example, if the point of
destination is Alexandria, unless transshipment is allowed so that the goods could be
shipped by truck, bus or rail from New Orleans to Alexandria, the issuer would have
to dishonor the presented draft on the grounds of non-compliance with the terms of
the credit because the goods did not arrive in Alexandria on the same vessel which left
the point of origin.
4) Does the buyer wish to stipulate that the seller ship the goods by a particular
ship or truck line? This is very important because some merchants receive a discount
for shipments on particular lines. If the seller chooses a different line for shipment and
the credit terms specify "F.O.B. point of shipment," i.e., the buyer pays the freight
charges from the point of shipment, the buyer's profit could be substantially reduced
by the increased freight charges he must pay.
5) What is the nature of the goods to be shipped? This is also important because
if the terms of the credit are "F.O.B. vessel" then the seller must, at his risk and
expense, put the goods aboard the vessel. This is particularly important since a derrick
barge would have to be rented at the dock to load the goods on the vessel if the goods
could not be loaded by the ship's rigging.
6) Are the goods of such a nature that they cannot be placed in the ship's hold
for shipment? Unless the credit allows an "on deck" shipment, the issuer will dishonor
the draft for non-compliance if the accompanying documents indicate that the goods
were transported on the deck of the vessel.
7) What type of insurance is sufficient? Is the effective coverage date of the
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B cause the credit to be opened in his favor at a specified bank
and further negotiations will complete the requirements of the
credit. The bank will issue a credit naming S as beneficiary and
listing certain documents which are to accompany his draft or
demand for payment. S will ship the goods to the buyer and
forward the documents to the issuer. Upon presentation of the
documents and draft, if all is in order, the bank will pay S. The
bank will then look to B for reimbursement pursuant to the
security contract between B, as account party, and the bank.'5
This illustration is greatly oversimplified because a host of
details would have to be decided by the parties before the
credit could issue. For example, a credit can be irrevocable or
revocable.' 6 Under the U.C.C. an irrevocable credit cannot be
revoked or modified without the consent of the parties to whom
it has been established." A revocable credit can be modified or
revoked unilaterally by the issuer, after establishment, without
notice to or consent from either the customer or the benefici-
ary.'" A credit is established as to the customer when the letter
insurance co-extensive with the earliest point at which the risk of loss shifts to the
buyer?
8) Does the buyer want to allow warehousing upon arrival?
The above are a few examples of the issues which would have to be anticipated
and resolved prior to issuance of a credit. The expertise of bank letter of credit depart-
ments in anticipating and resolving issues of this sort is a strong basis in itself for the
parties to consult with them when contemplating a letter of credit transaction.
15. Additional parties might include an "advising bank," which notifies the
beneficiary that a credit has been issued in his favor, usually by another bank; or a
"confirming bank," which by confirming the issuance of a credit in favor of the benefi-
ciary places itself in the same relationship with the beneficiary in which it would
have been had it opened the credit initially. U.C.C. § 5-107 (1972 version). See note
26, infra.
16. U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(a) (1972 version). U.C.C. § 5-106 defines the point at which
the issuer may not unilaterally revoke or modify an irrevocable credit. U.C.C. § 5-106
(1972 version) states:
1) Unless otherwise agreed a credit is established
(a) as regards the customer as soon as a letter of credit is sent to
him or the letter of credit or an authorized written advice of its issuance
is sent to the beneficiary; and
(b) as regards the beneficiary when he receives a letter of credit or
an authorized written advice of its issuance.
2) Unless otherwise agreed once an irrevocable credit is established as regards
the customer it can be modified or revoked only with the consent of the customer
and once it is established as regards the beneficiary it can be modified or re-
voked only with his consent . . ..
17. U.C.C. § 5-106(2) (1972 version).
18. U.C.C. § 5-106(3) (1972 version). Section 5-106(3) states: "(3) Unless other-
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of credit is sent to him or an authorized, written advice of its
issuance is sent to the beneficiary.' 9 A credit is established as
to the beneficiary when he receives the letter of credit or an
authorized, written advice of its issuance.20
Furthermore, the letter of credit may be a straight or a
negotiation credit. If it is a straight credit the named benefici-
ary is the only party entitled to payment and the beneficiary
can negotiate the draft or demand for payment only with the
issuing or "specially advised" party and not with an intermedi-
ary.' If it is a negotiation credit the beneficiary may find a
bank that will agree to negotiate his draft.22 For example, if the
seller of the sandals in the earlier illustration received an irrev-
ocable negotiation credit from the buyer in dollars, he could
find the local Japanese bank which would allow him the high-
est rate of exchange and negotiate his draft. 3 If the credit had
wise agreed after a revocable credit is established it may be modified or revoked by
the issuer without notice to or consent from the customer or beneficiary."
The U.C.C. will presume that all letters of credit are irrevocable unless the credit
clearly states that it is revocable. U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(a). The Uniform Customs and
Practice for Documentary Credits, however, contains the opposite presumption, i.e.,
unless the credit clearly states that it is irrevocable, it is presumed revocable.
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND PRACTICE FOR DOCUMEN-
TARY CREDITS art. 1(c) (1974 revision).
19. U.C.C. § 5-106(1)(a) (1972 version).
20. U.C.C. § 5-106(1)(b) (1972 version). Note that the credit is established for
the customer when sent by the issuer, whereas actual receipt by the beneficiary is
required before it is established for him. Thus a recognized exception to the traditional
mailbox rule of common law contracts could be available to prevent the establishment
of an irrevocable credit in favor of the beneficiary. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra
note 1, at 618. Suppose that in the illustration given in the text at note 11, after B's
bank sent by mail an irrevocable letter of credit to S, B requests the bank to cancel
the credit or B is placed in bankruptcy and the bank desires to avoid what is likely to
be an uncollectible debt. It appears from the language of the U.C.C. that the bank
could send a telegram repudiating or revoking the "in transit" credit. Thus the credit
is "overtaken" and never established for the beneficiary and U.C.C. § 5-106(2) is
applicable. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 618. There appear to be no
cases squarely on point, probably because in actual practice the beneficiary is advised
by cable or telegram that a credit has been issued in his favor long before the letter of
credit arrives by mail.
21. B. KOZOLCHYK, supra note 2, at 27. See also Joseph, supra note 3, at 817-18
n.ll.
22. B. KOZOLCHYK, supra note 2, at 27. See also Joseph, supra note 3, at 817-18
n.ll.
23. B. KOZOLCHYK, supra note 2, at 27. Most negotiation credits issued by Ameri-
can banks expressly allow the negotiation of drafts under the credit by a clause such
as the following: "We hereby agree with the drawers, endorsers and bona fide holders
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been an irrevocable straight credit, the seller could have ob-
tained payment only in Japanese currency at the bank men-
tioned in the credit. 4 The negotiation credit is probably the
most useful form of credit in modern international trade as it
allows the credit to be made out in a strong currency, so that
the beneficiary can negotiate his draft at the best discount in
relation to local currency."5
of drafts drawn in compliance with the terms of this credit, that the same will be duly
honored on presentation at the office of [issuer] on or before [expiration date]." Id.
at 519-20.
The credit may contemplate the receipt from the beneficiary or negotiating bank
of a time draft. A time draft is merely a written demand for payment which accompa-
nies the documents required by the credit but is not payable upon presentment. In-
stead, a time draft "matures" at a certain time after the issuing bank accepts the draft
and documents as complying with the terms of the credit. See U.C.C. § 3-410 (1972
version). In such a case, the clause may read as follows: "We hereby agree with the
drawers, endorsers and bona fide holders that drafts drawn and negotiated in conform-
ity with the terms of this credit will be duly accepted on presentation and duly honored
at maturity." INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, STANDARD FORMS FOR DOCUMEN-
TARY CREDITS No. 7(A) (1974). Furthermore, a clause which is a composite of the above
two clauses might be drafted so that either sight or time drafts would be honored under
the terms of the credit. It must be noted that even in negotiation credits, the benefici-
ary is not thereby authorized to delegate his performance of the underlying transaction
with the customer to another, he is authorized only to negotiate his draft in a manner
consistent with the terms of the credit subject to the bank's determination of the
documentary compliance with the terms of the credit. B. KOZOLCHYK, supra note 2, at
27. Probably the most common arrangement of negotiation credits is where the benefi-
ciary is entitled to draw on either the issuing bank or its branch or correspondent bank
at the beneficiary's domicile. Id.
24. Where a credit contemplates that only the named beneficiary is entitled to
draw under the credit, and only in the currency of the beneficiary's domicile, the
following clause might be inserted in the credit: "The above named opener of this
credit engages with you that each draft drawn under and in compliance with the terms
of this credit will be duly honored [on delivery of documents as specified at the office
of paying bank on or before expiration date]." B. KOZOLCHYK, supra note 2, at 27 n.69.
See also id. at 696 for an example of such a clause. The straight credit contemplated
by the clause above is one which has been specially advised, i.e., the advising bank
has been requested by the issuing bank to be the paying bank also. See Joseph, supra
note 3, at 817-18 n.11.
25. This type of negotiation credit is often called a circular negotiation credit.
B. KOZOLCHYK, supra note 2, at 27-28.
Issuers of negotiation credits in the United States have an additional concern, the
Foreign Asset Control Regulations of the federal government. The Foreign Asset Con-
trol Regulations delineate the foreign countries and currencies with which a United
States citizen or business can deal and set forth elaborate reporting and disclosure
procedures. These regulations are highly complex and a full discussion of this area is
beyond the scope of this comment; however, the issuer and his legal adviser should
thoroughly familiarize themselves with these regulations prior to the issuance of the
credits. See Foreign Asset Control, 31 C.F.R. §§ 500-30 (1977).
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The Letter of Credit and Traditional Contract .Principles
The ordinary letter of credit transaction for the sale of
goods involves three principal parties,"6 but there are only two
26. See text at note 13, supra.
Two possible additional parties to the letter of credit transaction are the advising
bank and the confirming bank. An advising bank is a bank, usually in the beneficiary's
locale or domicile and frequently a correspondent bank of the issuer, i.e., a bank where
the issuer has an account, which merely notifies the beneficiaiy that a letter of credit
has been opened in his favor. A confirming bank serves precisely the same function,
with one major distinction. The confirming bank, by confirming the issuance of a
credit, becomes directly obligated to the same extent as the issuer to pay the presented
draft or demand for payment when the accompanying documents comply with the
terms of the credit. By such payment, the confirming bank would acquire the issuer's
rights. U.C.C. § 5-107(2) (1972 version). Article 3 of the Uniform Customs and Practice
for Documentary Credits (1974 Revision) is in accord. The advising bank does not
assume any obligation of the issuer to honor drafts or demands for payment under the
credit, but it does assume an obligation for the accuracy of the statement. U.C.C. § 5-
107(1) (1972) version). In National American Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 425
F. Supp. 1365 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), the court correctly held that an advising bank has no
obligation beyond transmitting accurate information to the beneficiary. Article 3 of the
Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (1974 Revision) seems in
accord.
The case of Barclays Bank D.C.O. v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 481 F.2d 1224 (5th
Cir. 1973), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974), is illustrative of the problems which
can arise if an advising bank accidently confirms a credit. Bay Holding Co. was negoti-
ating a loan from Barclays to develop real estate in the Carribbean. Barclays refused
to loan Bay Holding Co. the $400,000 relying solely on the security furnished by Bay.
Therefore, Bay contacted Allied, a non-bank mortgage broker, who issued an irrevoca-
ble letter of credit in Barclays' favor. Mercantile, at the insistence of its customer,
Allied, wrote a letter "advising" Barclays that the letter of credit was opened in
Barclays' favor. This letter and the letter of credit were rejected by Barclays as not
conforming to current usage. Mercantile then sent a second letter along with Allied's
letter of credit confirming that the credit was opened in Barclays' favor. Barclays later
notified Allied that pursuant to the terms of the credit, it was presenting a 90-day
draft. Barclays presented the promissory note to Bay Holding Co., which refused to
pay it. Barclays then presented the draft to Allied, who dishonored, and to Mercantile,
who dishonored.
As a defense to Barclays' wrongful dishonor suit, Mercantile claimed that the
confirmation was in error because the responsible officer intended only to confirm the
authenticity of Allied's signatures. The court rejected this claim and held that when a
bank deals with another bank, it can assume that such bank is competent to conduct
its own affairs, therefore Mercantile was presumed to know and understand the conse-
quences resulting from its confirmation of Allied's credit.
Mercantile's second claim of defense was that dishonor was proper because the
presented documents were non-conforming. The court noted the fact that the notice.
of dishonor sent to Barclays stated that Mercantile had received Barclays' draft "with
all required Documentation called for in the Letter of Credit" and the bank therefore
could not now allege non-compliance. 481 F.2d at 1237 n.10. See Dovenmuehle, Inc.
v. East Bank of Colorado Springs, N.A., 563 P.2d 24 (Colo. App. 1977).
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traditional contracts and only one relationship which may be
called either an obligation or an engagement. The customer
will have a contract of sale with the beneficiary, which is some-
times referred to as the underlying transaction. The customer
will have a contract of reimbursement with the issuer." The
relationship between the issuer and the beneficiary is not
strictly contractual in nature, but it imposes an obligation to
pay upon compliance with the terms of the credit." The U.C.C.
describes this obligation in the following manner: "An issuer
must honor a draft or demand for payment which complies
with the terms of the relevant credit regardless of whether the
goods or documents conform to the underlying contract be-
tween the customer and the beneficiary." 9 Although the offi-
cial comment seeks to classify the issuer-beneficiary relation-
ship as "essentially contractual,"30 such classification is ques-
tionable since the letter of credit does not resemble a contract
in several respects, e.g., it does not require consideration,3' a
Finally, Mercantile argued that no confirmation in fact existed since under U.C.C.
§ 5-103 a bank could not confirm a letter of credit issued by a non-bank and thus
become directly liable to the beneficiary. Mercantile relied on U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(f)
which states: "A 'confirming bank' is a bank which engages either that it will itself
honor a credit already issued by another bank or that such a credit will be honored by
the issuer or a third bank." Mercantile claimed that the statute did not make sense
unless "the issuer" was also a reference to a bank. The court refused to accept Mercan-
tile's defense stating that the policy of the U.C.C. would not be furthered by such a
ruling, nor was such a result contemplated by U.C.C. § 5-102(3) which states: "This
Article deals with some but not all of the rules and concepts of letters of credit .
481 F.2d at 1231.
27. Banks which issue letters of credit wish to retain the greatest degree of
flexibility in the transaction in order to protect their interest in the event of changed
circumstances. Therefore, many issuers require the customer to sign a "security agree-
ment" which is attached to or incorporated in the application form which the issuer
requires its customer to fill out prior to issuance of a credit. This security agreement
is usually quite extensive and is intended to place the issuer in a position of little or
no risk of loss. Acceptance of the application is generally expressly stated to be accept-
ance of the security agreement. This writer feels that the accepted security agreement
constitutes a binding contract of reimbursement once the credit is issued. It is a
promise in return for performance supported by adequate consideration, and that is a
contract. See note 28, infra.
28. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 607. See also Comment, supra note
2, at 142. For a discussion of the specific nature, liabilities and remedies among the
various parties, see text at note 45, infra.
29. U.C.C. § 5-114(1) (1972 version).
30. U.C.C. § 5-114, comment (1) (1972 version).
31. U.C.C. § 5-105 (1972 version).
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bargained for exchange of promises, or a meeting of the
minds.32 Neither can a letter of credit properly be called a third
party beneficiary contract, an assignment, or a guaranty for the
following reasons.
The letter of credit is distinguishable from the third party
beneficiary contract because of the types of defenses available
to the issuer (promisor). In a third party beneficiary contract,
the rights of the third party beneficiary depend on the validity
of the contract between the promisor and the promisee. The
promisor can assertany defense against the third party benefi-
ciary that the promisor could assert against the promisee,33
including defects in the contract between the promisor and
promisee which developed after the formation of the contract,
such as intervening fraud or subsequent illegality.34 However,
in the letter of credit transaction, once an irrevocable letter of
credit is established for the beneficiary, the issuer must honor
the draft or demand for payment by the beneficiary if the docu-
ments accompanying the credit conform with its terms. This
is true even if the customer has repudiated the contract, be-
come insolvent, defrauded the issuer, or refused to perform
according to the terms of his contract with the issuer.35
32. A contract is a legally enforceable agreement between two or more persons
which consists of a bargained for exchange of promises or a promise in exchange for
actual performance by another supported by executed consideration. L. SIMPSON,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 1-7 (2d ed. 1965). However, U.C.C. § 5-105
expressly states that the letter of credit need not be supported by any consideration.
Moreover, the issuer-beneficiary relationship cannot be properly termed an agreement,
because generally the issuer and beneficiary are wholly unknown to each other prior
to the issuance of the credit. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 607. Although
the terms of the credit may reflect the mutual assent of the customer and the benefici-
ary to those terms, the issuer does not engage in the negotiations between the customer
and the beneficiary, so there cannot be an agreement or meeting of the minds between
the issuer and the beneficiary. See L. SIMPSON, supra, at 3, 7. Since a bargained for
exchange of promises is absent, the relationship can not be a bilateral contract. The
letter of credit is not a unilateral contract either, i.e., a promise by one party in return
for actual performance by another party. Id. at 5-6. The unilateral contract is not
binding on the parties until performance, yet the mere designation of a letter of credit
as irrevocable, coupled with receipt by the beneficiary, completes the issuer's obliga-
tion to pay pursuant to the terms of the credit. See text at note 16, supra.
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 140 (1973). For example, if A owes a
debt to C, he may enter into a contract with B that, in exchange for consideration from
A, B promises to discharge A's debt to C. In such a case, lack of mutual consent,
prescription, fraud or duress would all be assertable by B in a suit brought by C.
34. Id.
35. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 607.
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Similarly, the beneficiary in a letter of credit arrangement
is not an assignee of a contract right formerly held by the
customer. The customer, according to the terms of a letter of
credit, does not have the right to draw drafts under the credit;
only the beneficiary is so entitled. 6 Also, in a true assignment,
the obligor can assert any defenses against the assignee which
he could have asserted against the assignor." The beneficiary
of a letter of credit is immune from defenses that the issuer has
against the customer as long as the beneficiary has complied
with the terms of the credit."
Neither can the issuer's obligation be properly classified as
one of suretyship or guaranty, for either of two sound reasons.
First, in contracts of suretyship or guaranty, the surety is liable
only if the beneficiary is unable to collect from the principal
obligor, i.e., the surety is a secondary obligor." However, the
issuer in a letter of credit transaction is a primary obligor and
is liable to the beneficiary upon compliance with the terms of
the credit, notwithstanding any discrepancies in the underly-
ing contract between the customer and the issuer or between
the customer and the beneficiary.40 Secondly, the surety can
assert nonpersonal defenses of the obligor against the obligee.
In a letter of credit transaction, however, the issuer cannot
defeat the beneficiary's demand for payment by asserting a
defense which the customer had against the beneficiary."
36. Id. at 607-08.
37. L. SIMPSON, supra note 32, at 278-82.
38. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 5-09, 5-114 (1972 version); Arnold and Bransilver, The
Standby Letter of Credit-The Controversy Continues, 10 U.C.C.L.J. 272, 274-75
(1977).
39. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 608. The textual statement is only
true if the surety does not sign the original document of indebtedness. If the surety
signs the instrument, he is an accomodation party and is primarily liable on the
instrument. U.C.C. § 3-415 (1972 version). In Louisiana the contract of suretyship is
accessory to the principal obligation, LA. CiV. CODE art. 3035, and the surety is likewise
secondarily liable, i.e., his liability is predicated on the debtor's failure to pay. Id.
However, if the surety is liable in solido with the debtor, he is a primarily liable party
as to the creditor. This resembles a letter of credit relationship with the beneficiary,
except that the issuer of a letter of credit cannot assert any defenses against the
beneficiary which the customer would have against the beneficiary. A solidary surety,
on the other hand, may assert any non-personal defenses of the debtor. LA. Civ. CODE
arts. 3060, 2098.
40. U.C.C. § 5-114 (1972 version); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 608.
41. U.C.C. § 5-114 (1972 version); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 607.
A letter of credit is not a negotiable instrument, although the draft drawn under it may
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While the letter of credit transaction cannot properly be
called contractual, courts nevertheless apply traditional rules
of contract interpretation to the terms of letters of credit: thus,
if the issuer repudiates the credit after establishment but prior
to presentment, the issuer will be deemed to have
"anticipatorily breached a contract" for which damages are
due;4" letters of credit will be interpreted in a manner that
tends to uphold rather than defeat the credit;43 and the terms
of letters of credit will be "construed as strongly against the
issuer as a reasonable reading will justify.""
Interrelated Liability Among the Parties45
The interrelated liability among the parties, particularly
be negotiable, because the credit generally does not meet the requirements for negotia-
bility of U.C.C. § 3-104(1), particularly the requirement of an unconditional promise
or order to pay to bearer or to order. U.C.C. § 3-104(1)(b), (c) (1972 version). See J.
WHiTE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 608. However, it appears possible to draft a
negotiable letter of credit under the flexible guidelines of article 5 of the Uniform
Commercial Code. Henry Harfield presented an example of a use of letters of credit
which illustrates this point at the Fifth Annual Uniform Commercial Code Institute
in New York City. He hypothesized that ABC, Co. might desire to raise money by
selling its obligations in the commercial paper market, but could not assure the mar-
ketability of the issued promissory notes unless its credit were supported by that of
another solvent institution. A bank might therefore agree to issue the same number of
letters of credit as the promissory notes issued by the ABC, Co., and in the amount
of the face value of each note. For convenience one letter of credit could be printed
on the reverse side of each promissory note. If the beneficiary of the credit were the
bearer of the promissory note and the credit was a "clean" credit, i.e., only a demand
for payment was necessary to entitle the beneficiary to payment, the letter of credit
arguably would be a negotiable instrument. Harfield, The Increasing Domestic Use of
the Letter of Credit, 4 U.C.C.L.J. 251, 253 (1972). For the problems which the foregoing
example raises if the issuing bank is a national bank, see text at note 134, infra.
42. J. Zeevi & Sons v. Grindlay's Bank (Uganda), 37 N.Y. 220, 333 N.E.2d 168,
371 N.Y.S.2d 892 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 866 (1976).
43. Dynamics Corp. v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 356 F. Supp. 991 (N.D. Ga.
1973).
44. West Va. Housing Dev. Fund v. Sroka, 415 F. Supp. 1107, 1109 (W.D. Pa.
1976); Chase Manhatten v. Equibank, 394 F. Supp. 352, 354 (W.D. Pa. 1975), vacated
on other grounds, 550 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1977).
45. As discussed in the text at note 13, supra, in a letter of credit transaction in
the sale-of-goods context there are principally three parties, issuer, beneficiary and
customer; two contracts, customer-beneficiary and customer-issuer; and one obliga-
tion, issuer-beneficiary. See text at note 26, supra. The concerns of the issuing bank
focus on the two contracts; two questions are central, namely:
a) When can the issuing bank dishonor the beneficiary's presented draft in
order to protect its interests?
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between the issuer and the beneficiary, arises at the point the
credit becomes "established." Once an irrevocable credit be-
comes established, the credit can only be modified or revoked
with the consent of the parties involved. 6 The U.C.C. operates
b) What can the issuing bank do to insure that the customer will reimburse
the bank for funds paid in connection with the letter of credit?
46. See text at note 16, supra. See also U.C.C. § 5-106, comment (1) (1972
version) which states: "The primary purpose of determining the time of establishment
of an irrevocable credit is to determine the point at which the issuer is no longer free
to take unilateral action with respect to the cancellation of the credit or modification
of its terms."
. One recent case addressed the question of whether the issuer's assent is needed to
modify the terms of the credit, or whether the concurrent assent of both the beneficiary
and the customer is sufficient to accomplish a modification of the credit. In AMF Head
Sports Wear, Inc. v. Ray Scott's All-American Sports Club, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 222 (D.
Ariz. 1978), Ray Scott's caused an irrevocable letter of credit to open in favor of AMF
for the purchase of sporting goods. The credit stipulated that delivery was to be made
to Scottsdale, Arizona. However, AMF shipped the goods to Columbus, Indiana, pur-
suant to an agreement with Ray Scott's. The bank refused to pay the presented draft
for non-compliance, and AMF sued for wrongful dishonor. The sole issue was whether
the issuer was under a duty to modify the credit terms at the request of both the
customer and the beneficiary. The plaintiff introduced depositions of the issuer's offi-
cers which indicated that the issuer had issued the credit without checking Ray Scott's
financial status; that at the time the draft and accompanying documents were pre-
sented the issuer had reason to believe that Ray Scott's would be unable to reimburse
the issuer; that through dishonor of the draft for non-compliance the issuer was able
to extricate itself from this precarious financial situation; and that the issuer thereafter
refused to amend the credit. The plaintiff alleged that the general obligation of good
faith under article 5 of the U.C.C. required the issuer to amend the credit. 448 F. Supp.
at 224. The court rejected this contention, citing U.C.C. § 1-201(19), i.e., that good
faith means honesty in fact in the transaction, and stating that this issuer had not been
dishonest. Plaintiff's second allegation was that general banking usages required the
issuer to amend the credit. 448 F. Supp. at 224. The issuer, however, proved to the
satisfaction of the court that the trade usage which governed was article 3(c) of the
UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND PRAcTICE FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDITS, which requires the assent
of all parties to amend the credit. Id. Although it was not held that the U.C.P. codified
all banking custom, the court was satisfied that in Arizona no contrary custom or usage
exists. Id.
The court was quite correct in holding that the assent of all parties is required to
modify the credit for two reasons. First, U.C.C. § 5-102(3) states that article 5 deals
with some, but not all rules and concepts which govern a letter of credit transaction.
Therefore, although U.C.C. § 5-109(1) states specifically that the issuer's obligation
to the customer includes the observance of general banking usage, section 5-109 would
not prohibit the application of general banking usage to the beneficiary also. See
U.C.C. § 1-205 (1972 version). Thus even if the credit does not expressly state that the
provisions of the U.C.P. are applicable to the beneficiary and customer, the U.C.P.
should be applied as a general banking usage to require the assent of all parties. This
is particularly so since the provisions of the U.C.P. generally govern the actual prac-
tices of the banking industry regarding letters of credit. Interview with Boris Kozol-
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to keep an established irrevocable credit valid, unless the par-
ties consent to a change, even where the customer fraudulently
induces the issuance of the credit, or a mutual mistake is made
regarding the terms of the credit, or the customer repudiates
his contract with the beneficiary prior to compliance with the
terms of the credit.47 Section 5-106 states that after an irrevoc-
able credit is established as regards the customer, but prior to
establishment regarding the beneficiary, the issuer may revoke
or modify the credit only with the customer's consent." How-
ever, if the letter of credit is sent to the customer to forward to
the beneficiary and the issuer thereafter discovers fraud, duress
or mistake, the issuer should be allowed to revoke the credit
without the customer's consent if he can obtain actual posses-
sion of the letter of credit before it is established as to the
beneficiary.49 Also, if the credit is still in the possession of the
customer, an injunction should be obtainable to prevent the
customer from forwarding the credit to the beneficiary.50
After an irrevocable credit has been established as to both
the customer and the beneficiary, the issuer must honor any
draft or demand for payment complying with the terms of the
credit.5 The issuer who refuses to honor the draft or demand
chyk, Professor of Law, author of COMMERCIAL LETTERS OF CREDIT IN THE AMERICAS
(1966), in Baton Rouge, Louisiana (Feb. 14, 1979).
Secondly, there appears to be no commercially reasonable or desirable reason for
requiring the issuer to assent to a request for modification of the credit by the customer
and beneficiary. Indeed, such a result would be likely to inhibit the use of letters of
credit because the issuer would become subject to numerous possibly undesirable
amendments, e.g., an amendment to increase the credit amount, to make a non-
transferable credit transferable, etc. Such a rule would have the effect of negating one
of the general goals of the Uniform Commercial Code, to permit the continued
"expansion of commercial transactions." U.C.C. § 1-102, comment (1) (1972 version).
47. U.C.C. § 5-114(1) (1972 version). See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 1,
at 617-18. In at least one case, the court held that a beneficiary could not have assented
to a modification of the terms of the credit due to the ambiguous language used by
the issuer in seeking the modification. Associacion de Azucareros de Guatamala v.
United States Nat'l Bank of Oregon, 423 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1970). For a discussion of
this case, see note 77, infra, and accompanying text.
48. U.C.C. § 5-106(2) (1972 version). For the text of § 5-106, see notes 16, 18,
supra.
49. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 618.
50. Id. Since an injunction is an equitable remedy, an injunction should be
obtainable against the customer or the beneficiary if the issuer can meet the requisite
proof of irreparable harm. See LA. CODE CIv. P. arts. 3601-13.
51. U.C.C. § 5-114(1) (1972 version).
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for payment may be liable for wrongful dishonor.5" Wrongful
dishonor arises under the U.C.C. when the issuing bank is pre-
sented with complying documents and refuses to honor the
accompanying drafts,53 or when the bank delays honor of the
presented, complying documents and drafts beyond the close
of the third banking day following receipt and the presenter
does not expressly or impliedly consent to an extension of
time."
The issuer's wrongful dishonor, according to section 5-115
of the U.C.C., allows the beneficiary the remedies accorded a
seller under the Uniform Commercial Code." Section 2-710 is
the principal provision of the Code which addresses the dam-
ages awardable to the seller for the buyer's breach of contract;
it includes in addition to contractual damages such incidental
damages as "commercially reasonable charges, expenses or
commissions."56
Section 5-115's incorporation of the U.C.C. seller's reme-
dies presents a problem in Louisiana, since the state has not
adopted the sales provision of the U.C.C.57 The apparent hiatus
52. Two exceptions to this general principle will be discussed in the text at note
66, infra.
53. U.C.C. §§ 5-114(1), 5-115(1) (1972 version).
54. U.C.C. § 5-112 (1972 version). This article provides as follows:
(1) A bank to which a documentary draft or demand for payment is presented
under a credit may without dishonor of the draft, demand or credit
(a) defer honor until the close of the third banking day following receipt
of the documents; and
(b) further defer honor if the presenter has expressly or impliedly con-
sented thereto.
Failure to honor within the time here specified constitutes dishonor of the draft
or demand and of the credit.
This article waives the usual time period for a bank to dishonor an instrument
under article 4 of the U.C.C., i.e., generally a bank must send notice of dishonor by
midnight of the day of receipt, U.C.C. § 4-301, whereas § 5-112 allows the bank three
days following receipt. The reason for the longer time is simple; since the bank must
examine the draft or demand for payment and the accompanying documents and
determine whether the terms of the credit have been met, it must be given sufficient
time to do so.
55. LA. R.S. 10:5-115(1) (Supp. 1974) states that the person entitled to honor,
generally the beneficiary, has the rights of a seller against an issuer for wrongful
dishonor. The Louisiana statute deleted the reference to U.C.C. § 2-710 which is found
in U.C.C. § 5-115(1) since article 2 has not been adopted in Louisiana.
56. U.C.C. § 2-710 (1972 version).
57. By 1974 La. Acts, No. 92, Louisiana adopted articles 1, 3, 4 and 5 of the
Uniform Commercial Code and codified them as title 10 of the Revised Statutes. By
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is filled by reference to Revised Statutes 10:1-103, which states
that provisions of Louisiana law which are not displaced by the
adopted U.C.C. sections remain in force. The beneficiary's
remedies in the event of wrongful dishonor, therefore, are deter-
mined by resort to Louisiana law on sellers' remedies." Appli-
cation of the Louisiana sales law principles to the wrongful
dishonor situation gives rise to two questions:
(1) Does wrongful dishonor constitute passive breach of
contract under Civil Code article 1931, thus necessitating
a "putting in default" before suit? and
(2) What are the damages assessable in such a breach?59
Since an active breach of contract is defined as doing
something inconsistent with the obligation of the contract,"
the issuing bank's refusal to pay the draft or demand should
be considered an active breach." However, a wrongful dishonor
arising from the issuing bank's delay under section 5-112 more
1978 La. Acts, Nos. 164 and 165, Louisiana adopted Uniform Commercial Code articles
7 and 8, respectively. However, Louisiana has failed to enact Uniform Commercial
Code articles 2, 6, 9, and 10. See LA. R.S. 10:1-101, comment (Supp. 1974).
58. This result is mandated by two reasons, (a) Louisiana did not adopt article
2, and (b) when Louisiana adopted LA. R.S. 10:1-103 (Supp. 1974) the legislature
rejected the original U.C.C. text which read as follows: "Unless displaced by the
particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law and equity, including the law
merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel,
fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or
invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions." The legislature then supplanted
the rejected text with the following: "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of
this Title, the other laws of Louisiana shall apply." LA. R.S. 10:1-103 (Supp. 1974).
59. Planiol and Ripert have stated that damages due to the non-performance of
an obligation are of two kinds:
(a) natural and ordinary damages which were foreseeable by the debtor and
which he is bound to pay in every case; and
(b) exceptional damages which were unforeseeable by the debtor and he is not
bound to pay these unless the debtor has perpetrated fraud on the creditor.
2 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LAW § 250 (11th ed. 1939). This entire area
of letter of credit law needs an in-depth treatment on the extent to which the provisions
of LA. R.S. 10:5-101-5-117 (Supp. 1974) are supplemented by other provisions of Louis-
iana law, but such a treatment is beyond the scope of this article.
60. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1931. Conceptually it is difficult to speak of any breach of
"contract" between the issuer and beneficiary when there is no traditional contract
relationship, but merely an obligation or engagement owed to the beneficiary by the
issuer. See text at note 27, supra.
61. For an active breach of contract no putting in default is necessary. LA. Civ.
CODE art. 1932. See also Allen v. Steers, 39 La. Ann. 586, 2 So. 199 (1887); Levy v. M.
Schwartz & Bros., 34 La. Ann. 209 (1882).
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closely resembles a passive breach. A passive breach of con-
tract is defined as "not doing what was convenanted to be
done, or not doing it at the time, or in the manner stipulated
or implied from the nature of the contract.""2 With a passive
breach of contract the creditor, in most transactions, cannot
maintain an action against the debtor until the debtor is "put
in default."6 Moreover, damages in a passive breach are due
only from the time that the debtor has been "put in default."6
In an active breach, however, damages are due from the mo-
ment of the "act of contravention. ' 5
There are two exceptions to the rule that the refusal of the
issuing bank to honor drafts or demands for payments will be
a wrongful dishonor. The first exception occurs when the docu-
ments presented for payment do not conform to the terms of
the letter of credit, and the second when the implication of
section 5-114(2) applies.6 Each will be discussed separately.
Perhaps the issue most frequently presented in letter of
credit cases in which the issuer has refused to pay is whether
the presented documents complied with the terms of the
credit. 7 This problem is foreseeable given the nature of most
letters of credit transactions, i.e., the transactions often involve
numerous parties and translations of the credit and the accom-
panying documents into various foreign languages. Nonethe-
less the issuer is unconditionally bound to honor the drafts of
the beneficiary or other presenter if the documents conform to
the terms of the credit under penalty of liability for wrongful
dishonor. The U.C.C. is silent as to whether substantial com-
pliance with the terms of the credit will be sufficient to invoke
62. LA. Civ. CODE art. 1931.
63. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1933. See Temple v. Lindsay, 182 La. 22, 161 So. 8 (1935);
Jennings-Heywood Oil Syndicate v. Houssiere-Latreille Oil Co., 119 La. 793, 44 So. 481
(1907).
64. LA. CiV. CODE art. 1933.
65. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1932. Although there are no Louisiana cases discussing the
nature of the issuer's breach in letter of credit transactions, application of the code
principles seems clear. If the bank delays honor beyond the time allowed in § 5-112,
the bank's actions constitute a passive breach of contract and a "putting in default"
is necessary. LA. CiV. CODE art. 1933. If the bank refuses to pay the draft or demand
for payment then the refusal constitutes on active breach of contract.
66. See text at note 80, infra.
67. J. WHITE & R. SuMMERS, supra note 1, at 621.
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the issuer's obligation to pay,"8 although there seems to be
nothing in the U.C.C. which prohibits the customer and issuer
from contracting that substantial compliance with the credit
terms will suffice.6'
In the absence of an agreement between the customer and
the issuer permitting payment upon substantial compliance
with the terms of the credit, it is important to examine the
documents accompanying the draft or demand for payment for
strict compliance. An example of the strict compliance stan-
dard can be found in Bossier Bank & Trust Co. v. Union Plant-
68. In the case of Marine Midland Grace Trust Co. of New York v. Banco Del
Pais, S.A., 261 F. Supp. 884 (S.D. N.Y. 1966), the issuing bank, Marine, refused to
pay drafts drawn under an irrevocable letter of credit since the terms of the credit
stated that the draft should be accompanied by a "full set clean on board trucker's
bill of lading." The documents presented did not state that the goods were "on board,"
and the bank refused payment for non-compliance with the terms of the credit. The
defendant, Banco, answered that the bill of lading was in the customary Mexican form,
which does not specify "on board" for truckers' bills of lading. The court stated that
nothing less than strict compliance with the terms of the credit would bind the issuer
to pay. Accord Anglo-South American Trust Co. v. Uhe, 261 N.Y. 567, 184 N.E. 741
(1933); North Woods Paper Mills Ltd. v. National City Bank of New York, 283 App.
Div. 2d 731, 127 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1954).
In Far Eastern Textile, Ltd. v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 430 F. Supp. 193
(S.D. Ohio 1977), the defendant, City National, opened an irrevocable letter of credit
in favor of Far Eastern. The credit provided that the inspection certificate covering
the goods was to be signed by "Larry Fannim." The presented certificate of inspection
was signed "Larry Fannim by Paul Thomas." City National refused to honor the draft
on the ground of non-compliance; Far Eastern sued for wrongful dishonor. The court
properly noted that the issuing bank performs a mere ministerial function and should
not be concerned with the underlying contract between the customer and the benefici-
ary; thus, unless the agency arises from the terms of the credit itself, the bank need
not look beyond the presented documents to determine whether such agency in fact
exists. The court approved a bifurcated standard of compliance, e.g., when the suit is
against the issuer by the beneficiary for wrongful dishonor, the applicable standard of
compliance is nothing less than strict; however, when the suit is by the customer
against the bank for wrongful honor the standard is merely substantial compliance.
Id. at 196, citing Marine.
69. Article 5 deals primarily with the letter of credit itself and not with the
underlying issuer-customer and customer-beneficiary contracts. However, one of the
basic tenets of all the U.C.C. articles is clearly the freedom of contract between the
parties. This freedom of contract is subject to the good faith of the contracting parties
and the exercise of ordinary care. U.C.C. §§ 1-203, 5-109 (1972 version). The freedom
of contract principle can be evidenced by the provisions of article 5 which would allow
the parties to vary the statutory result by their contract. U.C.C. §§ 5-106(1), 5-106(2),
5-106(3), 5-107(1), 5-107(4), 5-109(1), 5-109(2), 5-110(1), 5-110(2), 5-111(1), 5-111(2),
5-113(2)(a), 5-113(2)(b), 5-114(2), 5-114(3).
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ers National Bank of Memphis.70 The plaintiff, Bossier Bank,
loaned $450,000 to Shreve Square, Inc. after Shreve Square,
Inc. had caused Union Planters to open an irrevocable letter of
credit in favor of Bossier Bank. The terms of the credit were
that Bossier Bank submit its demand for payment along with
a written statement "to the effect that you are entitled to draw
under this Letter of Credit in reduction of the loan to Shreve
Square on the River, Inc. pursuant to the terms of your com-
mitment letter dated January 21, 1973."' The commitment
letter of Bossier Bank apparently stated the conditions upon
which Bossier Bank would call the credit. Bossier Bank subse-
quently sent its draft and the written statement to Union
Planters. The issuer, Union Planters, refused to honor the draft
claiming that Bossier Bank fraudulently "called" the letter of
credit for a purpose not contemplated by the parties to the
underlying contract. Bossier Bank sued for wrongful dishonor.
The court, ruling in Bossier Bank's favor, refused to consider
whether the condition which prompted Bossier Bank to call the
credit was in fact one contemplated by the parties to the under-
lying contract. The court held that the underlying contract is
distinct and separate from the issuer's obligation to pay upon
proper presentment of complying documents. By a strict inter-
pretation of the terms of the credit, all that was required to
invoke the issuer's obligation to pay, was a statement that the
presenter was entitled to payment under the credit regardless
of whether Bossier Bank was in fact entitled to payment.72
In Courtaulds North America, Inc. v. North Carolina Na
tional Bank, 7 the issuing bank had to decide whether to pay
the presented draft when the complying documents did not
strictly comply with the terms of the credit. The account party,
desiring to purchase yarn from the plaintiff, Courtaulds,
caused the defendant bank to open an irrevocable letter of
credit in Courtaulds' favor. The terms of the credit stated, inter
alia, that the draft was to be accompanied by "Commercial
70. 550 F.2d 1077 (6th Cir. 1977).
71. Id. at 1079.
72. Id. at 1081-82 (emphasis added). The court also applied the familiar principle
of contract interpretation that any ambiguity in a contract or document is construed
against the maker. Id. at 1082. See LA. Civ. CODE art. 1957.
73. 528 F.2d 802 (4th Cir. 1975).
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invoice in triplicate stating . . .100% Acrylic Yarn .... ,,
Several shipments were received from Courtaulds in which the
presented documents did not strictly conform to the terms of
the credit. In each instance, the defendant bank gave notice of
the discrepancies to the account party, who then waived the
right to object to the deficiencies; thereafter the bank honored
the drafts. The shipment at issue arrived with a draft and an
invoice which stated "Imported Acrylic Yarn,"75 which by in-
dustry custom was in fact 100% acrylic yarn. The bank called
the account party to obtain a waiver of any objection to the
discrepancy; however, when the account party told the bank
that he had gone into bankruptcy and only the bankruptcy
trustee could make such a decision, the bank immediately
dishonored the draft for non-compliance; Courtaulds sued for
wrongful dishonor. The court rejected Courtaulds' contention
that the prior dealings of the parties either had amended the
terms of the credit or had constituted a waiver of the right to
object to the discrepancies in the shipment at issue and held
that the beneficiary must strictly comply with the terms of the
letter of credit in order to obligate the issuer to pay. Courtaulds
illustrates that since issuers deal in paper, they are justified in
dishonoring a draft when the accompanying documents do not
strictly comply with the credit, even though the goods to which
the documents refer do in fact comply with the credit terms.7 6
74. Id. at 804.
75. Id.
76. There are numerous cases in which the courts have upheld the issuer's refusal
to pay when there was a discrepancy between the terms of the letter of credit and the
presented documents. The following is a partial list of these cases with the conflicting
provisions of the credit and presented documents in parentheses: Filley v. Pope, 115
U.S. 213 (1885) (shipment from Leith v. shipment from Glasgow); Banco Espanol de
Credite v. State Street Bank and Trust Co., 385 F.2d 280 (lst Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 1013 (1968) (goods to be as sample inspected in Spain v. sample as per order-
stock sheet); Crocker First Nat'l Bank of San Francisco v. DeSousa, 27 F.2d 462 (9th
Cir. 1928) (150 tons .. . refined granulated sugar and 350 tons .. .refined fine
granulated sugar v. granulated sugar (150 tons) and fine sugar (350 tons)); Mitsubishi
Goshi Kaisha v. J. Aron & Co., Inc., 16 F.2d 185 (2d Cir. 1926) (Dallas to East
Rochester v. f....... . . Pacific Coast); Banco Nat'l Ultramarino v. First Nat'l Bank
of Boston, 289 F. 169 (D. Mass. 1923) (white crystal sugar v. Brazil white crystal sugar);
International Banking Corp. v. Irving Nat'l Bank, 283 F.103 (2d Cir. 1922) (striped Fuji
silk . . . as per your sample 400 v. made as per our designs and total width of stripes
not more than 50% of the material width); Brown v. Ambler, 66 Md. 391, 7 A. 903
(1881) (yellow pine lumber v. yellow pine flooring); laudise v. American Exchange
Nat'l Bank, 239 N.Y. 234, 146 N.E. 347 (1924) (Alicante Bouchez Grapes v. Grapes);
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A contrary result was reached by the courts in Asociacion
de Azucareros de Guatemala v. United States National Bank
of Oregon.77 In this case the court held the issuing bank liable
for wrongful dishonor when the bank failed to inquire into the
practices of the sugar industry in order to determine whether
the presented documents complied with the terms of the credit.
The case should not be followed" as it violates one of the most
Bank of Italy v. Merchants Nat'i Bank, 236 N.Y. 106, 140 N.E. 211 (1923) (raisins v.
dried grapes); Lamborn v. Lakeshore Banking and Trust Co., 231 N.Y. 616, 132 N.E.
911 (1921) (java white sugar v. java white granulated sugar); Oriental Pacific (U.S.A.),
Inc., v. Toronto Dominion Bank, 78 Misc. 2d 819, 357 N.Y.S.2d 957 (Sup. Ct. 1974)
(ladies sweaters, dresses, pants and skirts as per purchase order no. 848 v. woolen
knitwears); Talbot v. Bank of Hendersonville, 495 S.W.2d 548 (Tenn. App. 1972) (The
invoice bore the verbatim language required by the credit, but only as a notation, and
the itemized invoice listed non-complying parts; held, the bank was not required to
honor the draft where the notation but not the invoice conformed to the strict terms
of the credit); National City Bank v. Seattle Nat'l Bank, 121 Wash. 476, 209 P. 705
(1922) (granulated White sugar, Java No. 24 v. standard white granulated sugar);
Bank Melli Iran v. Barclay's Bank, [1951] 2 T.L.R. 1057 (K.B.) (goods' new v. 100,
new good); J. H. Rayner & Co. v. Hambro's Bank, Ltd., [1943] 1 K.B. 37 (C.A.)
(machineshelled groundnut kernels v. Coromodel groundnuts).
77. 423 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1970). The account party wanted to purchase sugar
from the plaintiff, Asociacion. Thereafter the account party caused the defendant bank
to open an irrevocable letter of credit in favor of the plaintiff. The terms of the credit
were that the bank would pay 90% of the invoice value after presentment of documents
stating, inter alia, "5,000 Long Tons . . . Bulk Raw Centrifugal Sugar of the 1965/66
Crop, F.O.B. . . . basis 96 degrees minimum polarization." Id. at 639. The word
"polarization" is a term of art in the sugar trade, definitional in character, as the
degree of polarization denotes the purity of the sugar. Raw sugar thus has a polariza-
tion range of 94-98 degrees. Upon arrival of the shipment the sugar polarized at
95.176358 degrees instead of 96 degrees as per the terms of the credit. The customer
then requested the bank to contact Asociacion and seek a modification of the credit
to 75% of the invoice value due to the lower polarization of the sugar. The bank did so
and Asociacion consented to the modification. When it contacted Asociacion, the bank
said that the sugar was "below credit requirements," id. at 641, and Asociacion took
this to mean that the sugar was below 94 degrees. When Asociacion learned of the true
deficiency, it sued for the difference between the 75% of the invoice value paid and
the original 90% claiming that the false statement by the bank entitled Asociacion to
rescind the modification and reinstate the original terms. The district court ruled in
favor of the plaintiff and the appellate court affirmed, holding that by definition "raw
sugar" must be between 94 and 98 degrees, therefore the word "minimum" in the credit
was superfluous. Thus the court erroneously held that the bank should have made
inquiries concerning the trade definitions with which it was dealing and failed to
understand that the credit's use of "96 degrees minimum" was intended to assure that
the sugar met a minimum level of purity.
78. Another case which has reached an incorrect result is Venizelos, S.A. v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, 425 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1970). Essentially, this factually com-
plex case concerned an agreement where customers of the defendant bank wished to
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basic letter of credit principles, i.e., that the issuing bank is not
required to look beyond the terms of the credit and the pre-
sented documents in order to decide whether to honor the
draft. 9
The second instance in which an issuing bank can dishonor
drafts or demands for payment drawn under the credit is when
the implication of section 5-114(2) is applicableso The impact
import certain goods from the plaintiff, Venizelos. To this end an irrevocable letter of
credit was opened in the plaintiff's favor by Banco Azteca and then confirmed by the
defendant bank. The terms of the credit specified 1) the transport ship, 2) that the
imported goods be about 9,690 metric tons, and 3) that no partial shipments were to
be allowed, i.e., all 9,690 metric tons were to be shipped at the same time. A later
amendment to the credit increased the number of tons importable to 19,300 metric
tons, but provided that all other terms of the original credit would remain unchanged.
When Venizelos presented his draft based on a shipment of 9,300 metric tons, the bank
refused to honor the draft as it represented a partial shipment. The plaintiff sued for
wrongful dishoner. The court held that since the credit stipulated the transport ship,
the bank had or should have had knowledge of the carrying capacity of the ship,
approximately 10,000 metric tons, and therefore the bank had incorrectly interpreted
the amended letter of credit as prohibiting partial shipments, a construction which
defeated the amended credit. Like Asociacion, this case imposed liability on the issu-
ing bank for not looking beyond the terms of the documents in deciding whether to
pay.
Venizelos and Asociacion remain the minority view among courts which have
addressed the issue; the majority do not impose liability on the issuer for failing to look
beyond the terms of the credit and the presented documents in determining whether
to honor the draft or demand for payment. Chase Manhattan Bank v. Equibank, 550
F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1977); Decker Steel Co. v. Exchange Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 330 F.2d
82 (7th Cir. 1964); DulienSteel Products, Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co., 298 F.2d 836 (2d
Cir. 1962); Cooper's Finer Foods, Inc. v Pan American World Airways, Inc., 178 So.
2d 62 (Fla. App. 3d Cir. 1965); Tueta v. Rodrigues, 176 So. 2d 550 (Fla. App. 2d Cir.
1965).
79. Note, An Issuing Bank's Duty of Payment Under an Irrevocable Letter of
Credit: Association [sic] de Azucareros de Guatemala v. United States National Bank
of Oregon, 12 ARiz. L. REv. 835 (1970).
80. See text at note 66, supra. U.C.C. §'5-114(2) (1972 version). LA. R.S. 10:5-
114(2) (Supp. 1974) states:
Unless otherwise agreed when the documents appear on their face to comply
with the terms of a credit but a required document does not in fact conform to
the warranties made on negotiation or transfer of a document of title or of
security or is forged or fraudulent or there is fraud in the transaction,
(a) the issuer must honor the draft or demand for payment if honor is
demanded by a negotiating bank or other holder of the draft or demand
which has taken the draft or demand under the credit and under circum-
stances which would make it a holder in due course and in an appropriate
case would make it a person to whom a document of title has been duly
negotiated or a bona fide purchaser of a security; and
(b) in all other cases as against its customer, an issuer acting in good
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of 5-114(2) is that the issuer may refuse to honor the drafts of
the beneficiary, but is not required to do so, 8 ' if:
a) the documents required by the credit do not conform
to the warranties made on negotiation or transfer of a
document of title or of a security,"2 or
b) the document is forged or fraudulent,"3 or
c) there is "fraud in the transaction."
However, if the party presenting the draft or demand for pay-
ment is a holder in due course" or a person to whom a docu-
ment of title has been negotiated or a bona fide purchaser of a
security, the issuer may not refuse to honor the presented draft.
Although 5-114(2) lists three instances when an issuer may
dishonor a draft with impunity even if the documents strictly
comply with the terms of the credit, the U.C.C. fails to define
certain essential terms in 5-114(2)-forged or fraudulent docu-
ments. White and Summers define forged documents under 5-
114(2) as those with forged signatures, 5 but a fortiori the sec-
tion should apply equally if the document itself is forged.
White and Summers also define a "fraudulent" document
within the terms of 5-114(2) as "one that is specious, conjured
up out of whole cloth, or one that has been materially al-
tered."" Although the case law on this issue is quite scarce, one
recent case defines fraud for 5-114(2) purposes in a rational and
logical manner. In West Virginia Housing Development Fund
v. Sroka,8 7 the district court in dictum stated that where fraud
is alleged between the original parties and the customer tells
faith may honor the draft or demand for payment despite notification
from the customer of fraud, forgery or other defect not apparent on the
face of the document but a court of appropriate jurisdiction may enjoin
such honor.
LA. R.S. 10:5-114(2) (Supp. 1974) differs mainly from the official U.C.C. text of §
5-114(2) only with respect to references to other articles of the U.C.C. which were not
adopted in Louisiana. See note 57, supra.
81. U.C.C. § 5-114(2)(b) (1972 version).
82. U.C.C. § 5-114 (2) (1972 version).
83. It is important to note that § 5-114(2) addresses itself only to forged or
fraudulent documents and not forged or fraudulent drafts. J. WHrrE & R. Summ Bs,
supra note 1, at 624 n.104.
84. U.C.C. § 5-114(2)(a) (1972 version). See U.C.C. § 3-302 (1972 version).
85. J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 624-25.
86. Id. at 625.
87. 415 F. Supp. 1107 (W.D. Penn. 1976).
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the bank not to pay, 5-114(2)(b) is applicable.8 According to
the court, unless the bank has notice of the fraud, forgery or
defect it cannot avoid liability for wrongful dishonor if the
terms of the credit are met; however, if the bank has such
notice, it has the option under 5-114(2)(b) to decide whether
to honor the draft. Noting that the Uniform Commercial Code
does not define fraud, the court stated that letter of credit cases
should invoke the traditional concept and definition of fraud,
i.e., an "intentional misrepresentation in order to profit from
another."'" In Sroka, the court applied a narrow definition of
fraud in interpreting section 5-114(2)(b) because the benefici-
ary had not been guilty of unscrupulous conduct. However, by
stating that the issuing bank's independent obligation to pay
should "not be extended to protect an unscrupulous benefici-
ary,"' 0 the court indicated a willingness to broaden the defini-
tion of fraud with respect to unscrupulous beneficiaries. In sup-
port it cited the principal case of Szetejn v. J. Henry Schroder
Banking Corp."
Szetejn is considered the leading pre-U.C.C. case illustrat-
ing the "fraud in the transaction" phrase of 5-114(2).2 Szetejn
involved the most egregious fraud imaginable. In that case the
documents included the required indication that fifty cases of
88. In Sroka, the plaintiff, West Virginia Housing Development Fund (Fund),
loaned $3,317,500 to Bridgeport Gardens Associates (B.G.A.) so that B.G.A. could
build low-cost housing. Sroka was the general partner of B.G.A. For insurance reasons,
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) agreed to endorse
B.G.A.'s mortgate note if B.G.A. would cause an irrevocable letter of credit to open in
Fund's favor, which B.G.A. did. B.G.A. defaulted on the loan and HUD paid the loan
amount less the amount of credit. The issuer refused to pay Fund's draft upon present-
ment. The issuer's defense to Fund's suit was that Fund was in bad faith in presenting
the draft because Fund knew that the funds represented by the credit were no longer
available to the plaintiff after B.G.A.'s default on the loan; therefore the issuer was
not bound under section 5-114(2)(b) to pay the draft. The court rejected this argument.
89. 415 F. Supp. at 1114.
90. Id. It is the author's opinion that the Sroka court was quite correct in refusing
to read the fraud requirement in 5-114(2) broadly, as the utility of the letter of credit
in commercial transactions is due in large part to the certainty of payment which it
gives to the beneficiary. If fraud in 5-114(2) is read broadly, some certainty would be
lost. Customers who wished to breach their obligations in the transaction would try to
prevent the issuer from paying a presented draft or demand for payment, accompanied
by complying documents, by alleging facts which otherwise might be relatively unim-
portant.
91. 177 Misc. 719, 31 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
92. J. WHITE & R. SuMMERSs, supra note 1, at 625.
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brush bristles had been shipped, although the "goods" shipped
were actually fifty cases of rubbish. The court enjoined pay-
ment at the request of the customer. If this case establishes the
standard for "fraud in the transaction," then the option to
refuse payment under section 5-114(2) is not available if the
underlying transactions are infected with ordinary fraud, such
as a knowing misrepresentation as to the quality of the goods,
or a breach of warranty by the beneficiary. 3 Furthermore, the
protection afforded by the fraud provision is limited in another
respect-if the presenter falls within one of the three protected
classes of 5-114(2)(a), even egregious fraud, such as in Szetejn,
would not permit dishonor. 4
Back-to-Back Letters of Credit
The previous sections of this comment have dealt with the
payment function of commercial or documentary letters of
credit in a sale-of-goods transaction in which the beneficiary
was the provider of the goods or the manufacturer-seller. 5 Let-
ters of credit also perform an important financing function
when the beneficiary-seller is not the ultimate producer of the
goods but is a middleman. This can be accomplished by use of
the back-to-back credit.
In order to understand the back-to-back letter of credit
transaction, consider the following illustration. Suppose that
the Louisiana merchant causes an irrevocable documentary
credit to be opened in favor of the Japanese seller of sandals.
If the seller is a middleman, he will need to procure the requi-
site amount of sandals from the sandal manufacturer in order
to comply with the terms of the credit issued in his favor. It
may be that he does not have the capital readily available to
pay the manufacturer in advance, or the credit to borrow the
capital needed, and the manufacturer is unwilling to sell on
open account. The middleman therefore will cause a second
letter of credit to open in favor of the manufacturer. Some of
the terms of the second credit will differ from the terms of the
93. Id. See also Dynamics Corp. of America v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank,
356 F. Supp. 991 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
94. U.C.C. § 5-114(2)(a) (1972 version).
95. See the illustration in the text at note 13, supra.
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first credit. For example, the amount of the second credit will
be less because the middleman will buy the sandals from the
manufacturer at a price below what he is charging the Louis-
iana merchant in order to make a profit and the date for deliv-
ery of the sandals under the second credit will be earlier than
that required under the first credit so that the middleman can
comply with the first credit's terms. However, the description
of the goods in the second credit must conform to the terms of
the first credit if the middleman expects to be paid. The manu-
facturer vill ship the sandals to the point of destination stipu-
lated in the second credit and the required documents and a
draft or demand for payment to the issuer of the second credit.
If the documents comply with the credit, the manufacturer will
be paid by the issuer of the second credit, who will send the
documents on to the middleman as agreed. The middleman
will then ship the sandals to the issuer of the original credit
along with the requisite documents under the credit. The ini-
tial issuer will then honor the draft drawn by the middleman,
who in turn will reimburse the issuer of the second documen-
tary credit." The Louisiana buyer will then reimburse the ini-
tial issuer and take possession of the sandals.
This process can of course encompass several successive
middlemen and can be quite complex. Because of the integrat-
ing function of intermediate issuers, refusal to pay by any such
issuer because of non-compliance with the terms of a back-to-
back credit can disrupt the entire transaction. Another com-
monly encountered problem is the unwillingness of an issuer of
a subsequent credit to rely on the contract for reimbursement
from the customer after the successful completion of the trans-
action. This may cause the issuer to require some security be-
fore opening a credit in favor of the manufacturer. Since most
letters of credit state that the draft or demand for payment will
not be paid unless accompanied by conforming documents and
the original letter of credit, the second credit issuer might re-
quire the middleman to pledge the first letter of credit before
it will open the second credit in favor of the manufacturer.
Since the second issuer would then retain possession of the first
credit, the middleman would not be able to forge complying
96. See J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 605.
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drafts and documents and present them for payment to the
issuer of the first credit. This retention of the original credit has
been called negative security.97
Decker Steel Co. v. Exchange National Bank of Chicago8
was a case involving back-to-back credits. Decker entered a
contract to buy steel from Associated through First National
Bank. Associated was a middleman, and in order to procure the
needed steel, Associated assigned its rights to the proceeds"
from the initial letter of credit to Exchange National as secu-
rity for the opening of an irrevocable letter of credit in favor of
the steel supplier, Brown. When the time for Associated to
deliver the steel passed without delivery, Decker notified Asso-
ciated that due to the delay (and the price of steel falling 25%)
Decker could no longer accept delivery of the steel. Associated
did not notify Exchange National. Brown timely presented a
draft and complying documents to Exchange and Exchange
honored the draft. Exchange presented the draft and comply-
ing documents to First National and was paid. The steel was
shipped to Decker who sold it at a loss and sued Exchange for
wrongful presentment. The court held that banks in letter of
credit transactions deal in documents only and that in deter-
mining whether or not to pay the presented draft they need not
look beyond the documents to the underlying transaction dis-
putes. Therefore, Decker's suit against Exchange was dis-
missed. 10
Although back-to-back credits can perform a valuable fi-
nancing function, at least one noted authority states that be-
cause of the potential problems which are involved, banks may
refuse to issue back-to-back credits for customers for whom an
independent credit would not be issued.101
97. B. KOZOLCHYK, supra note 2, at 490.
98. 330 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1964).
99. Even if the credit is designated as non-transferable or non-assignable, under
U.C.C. section 5-116(2) the beneficiary may assign his right to the proceeds under the
credit before performance of the conditions of the credit. Under LA. R.S. 10:5-116(2)
(Supp. 1974) such an assignment is treated as an assignment of a credit right under
the Civil Code and is governed by articles 2642 et seq. Article 47 of the Uniform
Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits allows a beneficiary to assign his right
to the proceeds under the credit even if it is designated as non-transferable in
"accordance with the provisions of the applicable law." INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE, supra note 6, art. 47.
100. 330 F.2d at 84.




A second financing function of letters of credit can be
achieved by the use of a transferable credit.102 The transferable
credit transaction must not be confused with the back-to-back
credit situation. In the transferable credit transaction the letter
of credit is made available to a new beneficiary. 0 3
The following example of a transferable credit transaction
illustrates the distinctions between transferable credits and
back-to-back credits. 04 Our Louisiana merchant causes his
bank to open an irrevocable, transferable letter of credit in
favor of the seller of goods, who happens to be a middleman.
In order to assure the manufacturer of the goods that the order
will not be withdrawn, or to prevent the middleman from hav-
ing to obtain pre-payment for the goods,- the middleman, as
beneficiary of the letter of credit, will transfer to the manufac-
turer his rights under the credit, i.e., his right to supply the
goods and receive payment upon presentment of a draft or
demand for payment accompanied by complying documents.
The main problem surrounding transferable credits is a
general confusion regarding the respective liabilities of the par-
ties. 05 Does the transferor remain personally liable to the issuer
if the transferee fails to perform? 6 Does a transfer of the letter
of credit render the transferee liable only for performance
within the terms of the credit, or for performances of the under-
lying contract with the account party also?'07 The U.C.C. is
silent as to the proper resolution of these issues.
102. Under U.C.C. § 5-116(1) the right to draw under a letter of credit can only
be assigned or transferred if the credit expressly states that it is transferable. Under
the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits, the right to draw under
a letter of credit can only be transferred pursuant to article 46; it can be only assigned
once, and only if the credit expressly states that it is transferable. Other terms, such
as "assignable," are wholly unacceptable. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
supra note 6, art. 46.
103. B. KOZOLCHYK, supra note 2, at 491.
104. See text at note 95, supra.
105. B. KOZOLCHYK, supra note 2, at 491-502.
106. U.C.C. § 5-116, comment 2 (1972 version) states:
"[If a letter of credit is transferable under 5-116(1)), the normal rules of assign-
ment apply and both the right to draw and the performance of the beneficiary
can be transferred, subject to the beneficiary's continuing liability, if any, for
the nature of the performance." (Emphasis added).
107. B. KOZOLCHYK, supra note 2, at 502.
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The issuers of transferable credits may also be concerned
about the potential for beneficiary double-dealing in transfera-
ble credits, i.e., when the beneficiary transfers the right to draw
under the credit to the transferee while retaining a copy of the
credit and then either negotiates it or presents it along with a
draft and forged documents for payment."' To prevent such an
abuse, the credit can provide that no draft will be honored
unless accompanied by the original letter of credit. If the trans-
feror were to attempt such double-dealing with a credit con-
taining such a clause, any subsequent holder of a draft not
accompanied by the original credit would be put on notice and
thus deprived of holder in due course status.109
A transferee could be protected against transferor double-
dealing by requiring the transferor-beneficiary to sign a notice
of assignment or transfer which reasonably identified the letter
of credit transaction and contained a request by the transferor-
beneficiary that the issuer pay the transferee. The notice of
assignment or transfer would then be sent to the issuer and the
transferee would take possession of the letter of credit (origi-
nal). If such a procedure were followed, an issurer who paid
another by mistake would remain liable to the transferee."0
Standby Letters of Credit
Although the letter of credit developed primarily as a doc-
umentary credit in the sale-of-goods transaction,"' since the
early nineteenth century the use of the secondary or financing
function has increased greatly due to the use of transferable
credits and back-to-back credits."' However, the use of another
important type of letter of credit has also increased-the
standby letter of credit."' A standby letter of credit obligates
108. J. WHITE & R. SuMmERS, supra note 1, at 635.
109. U.C.C. § 5-114(2)(a) (1972 version). See note 80, supra, and accompanying
text.
110. J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 637. See also U.C.C. § 5-116(2)
(1972 version).
111. See text at note 4, supra.
112. See text at note 95, supra.
113. This section will treat the standby letters of credit as being governed by the
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code and thus issuable by one other than a
bank. U.C.C. § 5-102 (1972 version). Additional problems are presented when such a
credit is issued by a bank, particularly a national bank. See text at note 134, infra.
1979]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
the issuer to honor the draft or demand for payment by the
beneficiary upon a failure of performance of the underlying
transaction."' While in the documentary or commercial letter
of credit, the issuer's obligation to pay is independent, sepa-
rate, and distinct from the underlying transaction, in the
standby letter of credit transaction the issuer's obligation to
pay is intimately related to the underlying transaction."' This
distinction prevents the standby credit from being called a
documentary credit, even though the credit will almost always
state that the draft or demand for payment must be accompa-
nied by a document stating that one of the parties to the under-
lying transaction, other than the beneficiary, has failed to per-
form and the presenter is thus entitled to draw under the
credit."'
The standby credit is the most recent development in the
field of letter of credit law and its use is increasing daily in
contexts formerly considered inappropriate for use of a letter
of credit." Standby letters of credit have been used to guaran-
tee payment of salaries,"' as collateral security for loans,"' as
114. See Harfield, The Increasing Domestic Use of Letters of Credit, 4 U.C.C.
L.J. 251, 258 (1972); Katskee, The Standby Letter of Credit Debate-The Case for
Congressional Resolution, 92 BANKING L.J. 697, 699 (1975).
Although the Uniform Commercial Code does not explicitly address the standby
letter of credit, the standby credit easily fits within the ambit of the omnibus clause
of section 5-102 which states: "[This chapter applies] (c) to a credit issued by a bank
or other person if the credit is not within subparagraphs (a) or (b) but conspicuously
states that it is a letter of credit or is conspicuously so entitled." U.C.C. § 5-102(1)(c)
(1972 version). Similarly, U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(a) is also broad enough to include the
standby credit. It provides:
(a) "Credit" or "letter of credit" means an engagement by a bank or other
person made at the request of a customer and of a kind within the scope of this
Chapter (5-102) that the issuer will honor drafts or other demands for payment
upon compliance with the conditions specified in the credit.
115. Katskee, supra note 114, at 701.
116. See, e.g. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Marguette Nat'l Bank of Minne-
apolis, 419 F. Supp. 734 (D. Minn. 1976); American Empire Ins. Co. v. Hanover Nat'l
Bank of Wilkes-Barre, 409 F. Supp. 459 (M.D. Penn. 1976), aff'd mem., 556 F.2d 564
(3d Cir. 1977).
117. For an excellent discussion of cases which illustrate the many uses to which
letters of credit are currently being put, see Joseph, supra note 3. See also Harfield,
supra note 51.
118. In Beathard v. Chicago Football Club, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 1133 (N.D. Ill.
1976), the football players had insisted that the defendant World Football League
franchise holder secure a letter of credit in their favor to guarantee payment of their
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a substitute for performance and libel bonds,20 as security for
salaries. The W.F.L. franchise defaulted and the players sought payment under the
credit. The court held that the players were not entitled to payment under the credit
because the credit was revocable and was revoked prior to presentment of the drafts
and notice of defendant's default.
119. In West Virginia Housing Development Fund v. Sroka, 415 F. Supp. 1107
(W.D. Penn. 1976), the plaintiff, Fund, executed a $3,317,500 loan to the partnership,
Bridgeport Garden Associates, of which Sroka was a general partner, in order for
Bridgeport to build low-cost housing. HUD agreed to endorse Bridgeport's mortgage
note to Fund provided that as a condition to the contract between HUD and Fund,
Fund would require Bridgeport to provide an irrevocable letter of credit in favor of
Fund to minimize HUD's liability should Bridgeport default. Bridgeport defaulted on
a balance of $764,868.24, and HUD paid Fund the amount of the balance less the
amount of the standby credit. Fund was entitled to recover the amount of the credit
from the issuer, also a party defendant. Accord Lindy v. Lynn, 395 F. Supp. 769 (E.D.
Penn. 1974), aff'd mem., 515 F.2d 507 (3d Cir. 1975).
In Harvey Estes Const. Co. v. Dry Dock Savings Bank of New York, 381 F. Supp.
271 (W.D. Okla. 1974), Dry Dock agreed to provide permanent financing for Estes'
construction project. Estes was to pay a loan commitment fee of $85,000 to Dry Dock,
half was paid in cash, half was put in escrow secured by an irrevocable standby credit
in Dry Dock's favor which would be payable if the loan did not close, refundable to
Estes if it did. The loan failed to close and Dry Dock was held entitled to payment
under the credit.
In Brummer v. Bankers Trust of South Carolina, 268 S.C. 21, 231 S.E.2d 298
(1977) the plaintiff was the bankruptcy trustee for Phillips Development Corp. Phillips
entered into a loan with Manhatten Life Co. for $1,750,000 and as a condition thereto
Phillips was to pay a loan commitment fee of $35,000, half of which was secured by
Bankers' irrevocable letter of credit. Phillips went into bankruptcy and Brummer, the
plaintiff, sought to enjoin Bankers from honoring Manhatten's draft. Manhatten was
allowed recovery, although the court mistakenly held that the credit was not a standby
letter of credit.
120. In American Empire Ins. Co. v. Hanover Nat'l Bank of Wilkes-Barre, 409
F. Supp. 459 (M.D. Penn. 1976), aff'd mem., 556 F.2d 564 (3d Cir. 1977), American
issued performance bonds for a contractor after the contractor caused Hanover to issue
an irrevocable credit in favor of American. The terms of the credit allowed American
the right to draw under the credit if it incurred any obligation due to its role as surety
for the account party. When the contractor defaulted, American was allowed to recover
under the credit.
In National Sur. Corp. v. Midland Bank, 551 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1977) National
Surety refused to issue a release of a libel bond on a ship held by United States
marshalls as to unrelated litigation without collateral from Astrorico Compania Nov-
iera, S.A., the ship's owner. Astrorico caused Midland to issue an irrevocable standby
letter of credit in favor of National Surety which authorized the beneficiary to draw
an aggregate of $10,250 under the credit if Astrorico failed to pay the judgment and
National Surety thereby suffered liability. Astrorico failed to pay the judgment and
the court held Midland's refusal to honor was unjustified and allowed National Surety
to recover. See also Victory Carriers, Inc. v. United States 467 F.2d 1334 (Ct. Cl. 1972);
Techem Chem. Co., Ltd. v. MIT Choya Maru, 416 F. Supp. 960 (D. Md. 1976).
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permanent financing'' and for interim financing, 2 ' and to per-
form other functions limited only by the ingenuity of the prac-
121. In Chase Manhattan Bank v. Equibank, 550 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1977), Chase
agreed to extend permanent financing of the construction costs of building a motel to
the builder upon completion of the project. The builder was to furnish an irrevocable
letter of credit in Chase's favor, payable upon presentment of a sight draft and certifi-
cation that the builder had defaulted on its obligation under the underlying transac-
tion. The credit guaranteed that Chase would receive its fee in the event of default.
Equibank issued the credit in favor of Chase. Chase's commitment to extend perma-
nent financing was contingent upon completion of the project by April 30, 1973, at
which time the credit also expired by its terms. The loan closing was set for April 27,
1973, but the builder failed to appear. Chase immediately sent a telex message to
Equibank requesting payment and on April 30 Chase telephoned Equibank during
business hours to confirm the telex message and to confirm that the draft and proper
documents would be sent via regular channels. When Equibank received the draft and
confirmation of default on May 10, it dishonored for untimely compliance. Chase sued
for wrongful dishonor alleging that the April 30 telephone conversation was a waiver
by Equibank of the time limitation of the credit. The district court granted summary
judgment for Equibank without reaching the waiver issue, holding that the issuer could
not modify the terms of the credit without the applicant's consent.
The court of appeals reversed and remanded holding that if a waiver in fact
occurred, the customer's consent to a unilateral modification of the credit by the issuer
would be unnecessary since the issuer-beneficiary and issuer-customer relationships
are independent. The court stated:
If the issuing bank, by choice or inadvertence, waives a restriction in the letter
of credit and pays the beneficiary despite the noncompliance, the issuer jeopard-
izes its right to reimbursement from the customer. The possibility that the
issuer may not be able to recover from the customer, however, does not bar the
beneficiary in his suit against the bank. The beneficiary bases his claim on the
letter of credit as modified by the bank and acceptable to him-not on the
agreement between the customer and the issuing bank, nor upon the underlying
arrangement between customer and beneficiary.
550 F.2d at 886.
Chase provides a good example of the problem which may face a court when the
applicable portions of the U.C.C. and the U.C.P. conflict. In Chase the court construed
U.C.C. § 5-106(2), which provides that after establishment with respect to the
customer, the irrevocable credit can only be modified or revoked with his consent, yet
the customer's consent is not needed to effect a modification with respect to the
beneficiary. Thus the issuer must pay the draft under the modified credit while faced
with the possibility of not being reimbursed by the customer-because he did not
consent to the modification. A different result would have occurred by application of
the U.C.P. The court noted that the provisions of the U.C.P. were applicable as were
those of the U.C.C., yet under article 3(c) of the U.C.P., the consent of all parties is
required to effect a cancellation or amendment of the credit after establishment. The
court in AMF Head Sports Wear, Inc. v. Ray Scott's All-American Sports Club, Inc.,
448 F. Supp. 222,(D. Ariz. 1978), held that the issuer's consent, as well as the benefici-
ary's and customer's consent, was necessary to amend an irrevocable credit. See note
46, supra. Thus under the U.C.P. Equibank would have succeeded in its defense that
no modification occurred; and therefore Chase would not have been entitled to pay-
ment because of non-compliance.
122. Meltzer v. Crescent Leaseholds, Ltd., 315 F. Supp. 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),




The issuance of a standby letter of credit is an assumption
of a greater risk than that incurred in issuing a documentary
credit in a sale-of-goods transaction. This is true because in the
standby credit transaction, the beneficiary can draw under the
credit only if the underlying transaction has failed.14 If the
beneficiary becomes entitled to draw under the credit due to
the account party's default on the underlying obligation, the
bank's claim for reimbursement from the account party may
well will be worthless.12 Furthermore, when the underlying
transaction involves an obligation by the account party, the
issuing bank will not even have the protection which it is af-
forded in the sale-of-goods transaction.' 5
123. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 515 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976) ($75 million credit used in lieu of a suspensive appeal
bond); Wichita Eagle & Beacon Publishing Co., Inc. v. Pacific Nat'l Bank of San
Francisco, 493 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1974) (credit in favor of lessor to guarantee lessee's
performance held to be a guaranty contract because the issuer was required to look
beyond the documents in determining whether to pay); Transport Management Co.
v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 326 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1963) (credit
used as proof of financial responsibility); Dulien Steel Products, Inc. v. Bankers Trust
Co., 189 F. Supp. 922 (S.D. N.Y. 1960), aff'd, 298 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1962) (payment of
brokers' fees); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Marquette Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis, 419 F.
Supp. 734 (D. Minn. 1976) (payment of loan commitment fees); Fair Pavillions, Inc.
v. First Nat'l City Bank, 19 N.Y.2d 512, 227 N.E.2d 839, 281 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1967) (credit
used to secure construction progress payments); Brummer v. Bankers Trust of South
Carolina, 268 S.C. 21, 231 S.E.2d 298 (1977)(payment of loan commitment fees).
124. See text at note 114, supra.
125. See note 126, infra, and accompanying text.
126. See also B. KOZOLCHYK, supra note 2, at 119-69. It should be recalled that
in a sale-of-goods transaction, the issuing bank will be presented with several docu-
ments, among them the bill of lading. If the account party refuses to perform as per
the contract with the issuer, the bill of lading allows the issuer to sell the goods and at
least minimize its loss. The issuer has no such option in a standby credit situation.
However, the issuer should very carefully consider the propriety of this course of
action. While custom and usage would seem to allow this conduct, the ex parte action
on the part of the issuer might be a deprivation of property without due process of law
insofar as the account party is denied the opportunity to a prior hearing to determine
the validity of his refusal to perform under the contract. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67 (1972). Consequently, the account party might also have an action for depriva-
tion of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1977), in addition to a breach of
contract action against the issuer. But see Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
Note that one cannot correctly speak of the issuer in a documentary credit situa-
tion as being "secured" solely because he will come into possession of the bill of lading.
In Louisiana there are only four types of security devices-pledge, mortgage, surety-
ship and privilege, and they are stricti juris, i.e., strictly construed. See LA. CIV. CODE
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In order to more fully understand the risks involved in
issuing a standby credit, one must understand the relation-
ships which arise, due to the issuance of the credit. The issuer
is not a surety;' 7 nor can he properly be classified as a solidary
obligor.'2 A solidary obligor is given certain rights under the
Civil Code which are clearly incompatible with the letter of
credit format. For instance, if one solidary obligor makes pay-
ment to the creditor, the other solidary obligors are also re-
leased from liability to the creditor.'29 In a letter of credit con-
text, however, regardless of what has transpired between the
account party and the beneficiary, the issuer must pay upon
compliance with the terms of the credit.' 30 Also, the solidary co-
obligor who pays the debt can only seek contribution from the
other co-obligors for their virile portion,' 31 while the issuer, by
virtue of the contract with the account party should have a
right to the full amount paid under the credit from the account
party.
The' issuer of a credit, particularly a standby credit, should
art. 3183 for the general rule that "[tihe property of the debtor is the common pledge
of his creditors .... " If the issuer were in a position where it was critical that he be
a "secured creditor," he could make the somewhat tenuous argument that the bill of
lading was given by the debtor's agent, the beneficiary, in order to secure the debt and
it is therefore a pledge. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 3133. Compare the security device
provisions of the Civil Code with article 9 of the U.C.C. See also J. WHrrE & R.
SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 730; Sachse, Report to the Louisiana Law Institute on
Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code, 41 TUL. L. REv. 505 (1967).
127. See text at note 38, supra. Since the relationship of the issuer is not one of
suretyship, the issuer cannot take advantage of the subrogation rights of a surety who
pays the principle obligation. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 3052, 3053. For very similar
reasons the surety has no indemnity action against the debtor (account party) under
article 3057. Article 3057 by its terms is applicable only to sureties. Beyond this, article
3057 assumes that the obligations of the debtor and the surety are directly related to
the debtor-creditor obligation. For example, the surety has the right to assert non-
personal defenses of the debtor when sued on the obligation. In the letter of credit
transaction, the issuer-beneficiary relationship is wholly independent and separate
from either the issuer-account party or the account party-beneficiary relationships. See
text at note 45, supra.
128. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2082 states:
When several persons obligate themselves to the obligee by the terms in solido,
or use any other expressions, which clearly show that they intend that each one
shall be separately bound to perform the whole of the obligation, it is called an
obligation in solido on the part of the obligors[.]
129. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2091.
130. See text at note 51, supra.
131. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2103.
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realize that upon payment under the credit the issuer simply
becomes an unsecured creditor of the account party unless the
issuer-account party contract gives the issuer some protection.
The issuer should protect himself by executing a security con-
tract with the account party. Several options are available to
the issuer who agrees to issue a standby credit. The most desir-
able solution to the issuer would be to require the account party
to place with the issuer, in advance, a sum of money or other
highly liquid assets in an amount equal to the issuer's maxi-
mum liability. 32 While there may be circumstances in which
the account party will find this agreeable,' 33 generally in a
standby credit transaction the account party needs a credit to
secure some other form of financing and will not have the capi-
tal available to place with the issuer. The solution most likely
to satisfy both the issuer and the account party will be a con-
tract of reimbursement and the simultaneous execution of one
or more promisory notes by the account party to the issuer, the
notes being secured by either a chattel or conventional mort-
gage on the account party's property. The notes will generally
have an acceleration clause which will mature the note upon
the issuer's payment under the credit.
Standby Letters of Credit and National Banks
Because banks are generally the parties which issue letters
of credit on a regular basis, and because the federal regulations
which overlay the issuance of credits by national banks are very
complex, this section will deal with the particular requirements
and problems which a national bank must face in issuing
standby letters of credit. National banks are authorized to
issue letters of credit of all types governed by the Uniform
Commercial Code or the Uniform Customs and Practice for
Documentary Credits (U.C.P.),131 subject to five criteria for
132. To similar effect is the frequent contract provision that the account party
will keep a sufficient balance in his checking account to cover the issuer's maximum
or potential liability under the credit-the so-called "compensating balance." The
problem with this from the issuer's viewpoint is that the balance may inadvertently
fall below the issuer's limits of liability under the credit.
133. This arrangement is generally more acceptable in the sale-of-goods transac-
tion where the buyer could pay cash for the goods, but wishes to receive the benefit of
the issuer's knowledge and experience in this complex area of trade.
134. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7016 (1978) (effective May 12, 1977).
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safe and sound banking practice regarding issuance of letters
of credit.3 5
The first federal regulatory criterion is that the credit can
be issued by the bank only to or on behalf of the bank's cus-
tomer.I It may be of some importance to note that the Comp-
troller did not define "customer" in the regulation. Should the
issuer take a very restrictive approach and assume that only
one who has a checking account, a savings account, or other
consistent business contacts with the issuer is a customer for
the purposes of regulation, or is a less restrictive view of the
definition preferable? Since the regulation generally approves
credits issued under either the U.C.C. or the U.C.P., the writer
suggests the adoption of the U.C.C. definition of customer, "a
buyer or other person who causes an issuer to issue a credit
[or] a bank which procures issuance or confirmation on behalf
of that bank's customer.""'3 The breadth of such a definition
would surely facilitate letter of credit transactions.
The second criterion of the regulation is that the letter of
credit conspicuously state that it is a letter of credit or at least
be conspicuously entitled a letter of credit.' 8 This requirement
adds nothing to the bank's duty, as the language merely tracks
the definition of a letter of credit under section 5-102.'19
The regulation's third criterion is that the bank's under-
taking, i.e., issuance of the credit, contain a specified expira-
tion date or be limited to a definite period of time.'40 This
presents no problems where the bank does single, infrequent
transactions for a customer. However, it is conceivable that a
customer could have a long-term supply contract with the ben-
135. Id. It is arguable that the five criteria set out by the Comptroller in 12
C.F.R. § 7.7016 are only guidelines for safe and sound banking practice and not defini-
tional of such practices with regard to the issuance of letters of credit. However, a
finding that a bank is conducting or engaging in unsafe and unsound banking practices
has such dire consequences that few banks are likely to disregard § 7.7016. For exam-
ple, under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (1977), a state member
bank or a national bank can be required to cease and desist from unsafe and unsound
practices and have its insured status withdrawn and be placed in receivership. See J.
WHITE, BANKING LAW 717-59 (1976).
136. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7016 (1978).
137. U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(g) (1972 version). See also note 148, infra.
138. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7016(a) (1978). See note 100, supra.
139. U.C.C. § 5-102 (1972 version).
140. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7016 (1978).
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eficiary in which the mode of payment is by letter of credit
upon performance, or the customer might have a continuous
contract with the beneficiary which requires periodic or multi-
ple performance bonds and the parties might agree that a letter
of credit will be substituted for the bond. In these instances it
is desirable for the parties to execute a single credit that allows
multiple transactions to take place between the customer and
the beneficiary without execution of a new credit for each
transaction.
The credit can be drafted so that it complies with the
definite term requirement yet allows sufficient flexibility to the
parties. There appears to be no prohibition against issuing a
letter of credit which contains an expiration clause such as the
following:
This letter of credit is to expire one year from the date of
issuance and is hereby to be automatically extended with-
out further amendment or action by the parties for one
year from any present or future expiration date, unless the
issuer notifies the beneficiary hereof thirty days prior to
such present or future expiration date that this letter of
credit shall not be extended, provided further that nothing
herein shall authorize the extension of this letter of credit
beyond (some date several years in the future).'
The fourth criterion is that the bank's obligation should be
limited in amount and its obligation to pay should arise only
upon the presentation of a draft or other documents specified
in the letter of credit.' Prior to the 1977 amendment to section
7.7016 this requirement was the basis of some speculation as
to the validity of a standby credit issued by a national bank
because the section stated that: "the bank's obligation to pay
must arise only upon the presentation of specific documents"
141. See National Sur. Corp. v. Midland Bank, 551 F.2d (3d Cir. 1977), where a
similar extension clause was at issue under a credit opened by a New Jersey State
Bank. The court felt that the governing statute, N.J. REv. STAT. 17:9A-25(3) (1948),
was designed to place state banks at parity with national banks with respect to dura-
tion of credits. Thus the court interpreted the statute to allow a letter of credit issued
by a state bank to extend for periods of more than one year and held that the statute
merely prohibited the drafts drawn under the credit remaining negotiable for more
than one year.
142. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7016 (1978).
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specified in the letter of credit."' Since often the only
"document" required under a standby credit is a statement by
the beneficiary that the underlying obligation is in default and
he is entitled to draw under the credit,"' some banks construed
the language as applicable only to documentary credits in a
sale-of-goods transaction.145 The 1977 amendment to section
7.7016 revised the phrase to read "draft or other documents
.... 9,14" This should be viewed as a specific recognition by the
Comptroller of the Currency of the widespread use of the
standby letter of credits in modern banking and as his sanction
for their use.
The regulation also reinforces a basic tenet of letter credit
law: the bank must not be called upon to determine questions
of fact or law at issue between the account party and the bene-
ficiary.' 47 The Comptroller's position on this principle is well
founded; apparently it is also very strong since this criterion
and the criterion that a credit only be issued to or on behalf of
a customer, are the only ones phrased in mandatory lan-
guage.' 48
The final requirement of section 7.7016 is that the bank's
customers have an unqualified obligation to reimburse the
bank for payments made under the letter of credit. 4' This sec-
tion is satisfied if at the time of the issuance of the credit the
customer agrees, usually by execution of a promissory note, to
repay the issuer for drafts drawn and paid under the credit.
This requirement evidences the Comptroller's acceptance of a
basic concept in letter of credit law: the bank's obligation to
pay depends solely upon the presentation of complying docu-
ments, and subsequent developments in the underlying trans-
143. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7016 (1972) (as it appeared prior to the 1977 amendment)
(emphasis added).
144. See Bossier Bank & Trust Co. v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank of Memphis,
550 F.2d 1077 (6th Cir. 1977), discussed in the text at note 70, supra.
145. See COMPTROLLERS INTERPRETIVE RULING ON LErrERS OF CREDIT, 42 Fed. Reg.
24206 (1976) (Revised).
146. Id., codified in 12 C.F.R. § 7.7016 (1978).
147. See the text at note 69, supra.
148. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7016 (1978). Furthermore, this is the only time in § 7.7016 that
the term "account party" is used instead of customer. Does this requirement contem-
plate a different class of persons than is contemplated by the use of the word customer
in the U.C.C.? Neither the cases nor statutes provide an answer.
149. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7016 (1978).
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actions and obligations are irrelevant.'15
While section 7.7016 generally recognizes all letters of
credit which can be issued under the U.C.C. or the U.C.P.,'5'
the Comptroller has expressly defined a standby letter of credit
as follows:
A "standby letter of credit" is any letter of credit, or simi-
lar arrangement however named or described, which rep-
resents an obligation to the beneficiary on the part of the
issuer 1) to repay money borrowed by or advanced to or
for the account of the account party or 2) to make pay-
ment on account of any indebtedness undertaken by the
account party, or 3) to make payment on account of any
default by the account party in the performance of an
obligation."52
The standby letter of credit, according to this definition, does
not include the commercial letter of credit "and similar instru-
ments where the issuing bank expects the beneficiary to draw
upon the issuer, which do not 'guaranty' payment of a money
obligation and which do not provide for payment in the event
of default by the account party."'53
One may reasonably wonder why the Comptroller has
given special attention to the standby credit rather than treat-
ing it with other types under the general letter of credit authori-
zation. ,4 The answer is twofold. First, letters of credit generally
and standby letters of credit particularly are considered as
being in the nature of a loan for purposes of determining a
bank's lending limit.'55 Thus the maximum potential liability
150. See text at note 36, supra.
151. See note 134, supra, and accompanying text.
152. 12 C.F.R. § 7.1160 (1978).
153. Id. at n.1.
154. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7016 (1978).
155. 12 C.F.R. § 7.1160 (1978) provides as follows: "(b) Subject to lending limits.
A standby letter of credit is subject to the limitations of section 84 and must be
combined with any other non-excepted loans to the account party by the issuing bank
for the purpose of applying section 84."
Although there are no reported cases which deal with this issue, it seems logical
to assume that if a standby credit requires the issuing bank to accept the presented
draft, then the transaction is no longer governed by the standby credit regulations but
rather by the banker's acceptance regulations. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.1500-.1630. Of course
it is doubtful that the acceptances generated by the standby credit would fall within
one of those exceptions.
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of the issuer bank under the standby letter of credit enters into
the calculation of whether the total obligations of any one per-
son, partnership, corporation, etc. to the national bank exceed
10% of its unimpaired, paid-in capital stock and 10% of its
unimpaired surplus.' 6 Secondly, standby letters of credit are
considered as contingent liabilities of the bank and must be
reported as a general note to the balance sheet. 7 However,
there are three situations in which the standby letter of credit
is not subject to the provision of title 12, section 84, of the
United States Code. These exceptions occur if:
a) prior to or at the time of issuance, the issuing bank is
paid an amount equal to the bank's maximum liability
under the standby letter of credit;' 8 or
b) prior to or at the time of issuance, the issuing bank
has set aside sufficient funds in a segregated deposit ac-
count, clearly earmarked for that purpose, to cover the
bank's maximum liability under the standby letter of
credit; 5 9 or
c) the Comptroller of the Currency has found that a par-
ticular standby letter of credit will not expose the issuer
to the similar risk of loss as would a loan to the account
party. 160
Prior to the May 12, 1977 amendment to section 7.7016,
several cases arose in which the defendant bank in a suit for
wrongful dishonor argued that dishonor was justified because
the standby credit it had issued was a guaranty which was
beyond the power of the bank to lawfully issue. With general
uniformity the courts distinguished a prohibited guaranty from
the standby credit by noting that a guarantor is a secondary
obligor, whereas the issuer of a credit is a primary obligor.'' No
156. 12 U.S.C. § 84 (1972). The purpose of this provision is to increase stability
of banks by spreading the risks among many borrowers rather than allowing a small
number of borrowers to utilize a large portion of the deposits. 12 C.F.R. § 7.1310 (1978).
157. 12 C.F.R. § 11.7(c)(9)(vii) (1978).
158. Under 12 C.F.R. § 204.104 (1978), the Comptroller has ruled that these cash
collateral accounts are considered a deposit against which a Federal Reserve member
bank must maintain adequate reserves. See 12 U.S.C. § 461 (1974).
159. 12 C.F.R. § 7.1160(c) (1978).
160. Id.
161. Barclays Bank D.C.O. v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 481 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir.
1973); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Marquette Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis, 419 F.
Supp. 734 (D. Minn. 1976); Hyland Hills Metropolitan Park and Recreational Dist. v.
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cases were found in which this argument was based on the May
12, 1977 amendment to section 7.7016. This is not surprising
since the amendment, if anything, should reinforce the position
previously taken by most courts.
The Comptroller's 1977 amendment to section 7.7016 may
have additional significance because of what it did not state.
The Comptroller could have taken a very firm position against
standby letters of credit by allowing only those letters of credit
which were permissible under either the U.C.C. or U.C.P. and
conformed to the five criteria listed. The effect of such a ruling
would surely have caused national banks to adopt very conserv-
ative standby credit issuance policies. However, by providing
that national banks can issue any credits allowable under the
U.C.C. or U.C.P., subject only to standards for safe and sound
banking practice, the Comptroller has taken a rather liberal
view toward standby credits. The conspicuous absence of liti-
gation challenging the national banks' authority to issue
standby credits which do not meet the five criteria indicates
the financial community's acceptance of the interpretation.
Banks will no doubt take a conservative stance with regard to
the criteria in section 7.7016. However, the fact that these cri-
teria are to be used only in determining whether a bank is
conducting safe and sound banking practices'62 indicates to this
writer an official sanction for the use of standby credits and
also should provide an impetus for expansion of that use.
Conclusion
Letters of credit are becoming increasingly more impor-
tant in commerce and industry. No longer is the function of the
letter of credit limited to the traditional sale-of-goods context.
Rather, the increased acceptance and use of transferable and
back-to-back credits have added increased flexibility and util-
ity to such traditional sale-of-goods transactions. In addition to
the use of the letter of credit to accomplish a mere payment
McCoy Enterprises, Inc., 554 P.2d 708 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976). Contra, Wichita Eagle
and Beacon Pub. Co., Inc. v. Pacific Nat'l Bank of San Francisco, 493 F.2d 1285 (9th
Cir. 1974), in which the court recognized the expanding role of letters of credit as
financing devices, but refused to follow those decisions distinguishing standby credits
from guaranties.
162. See 12 C.F.R. § 7.7016 (1978).
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function, the standby letter of credit and the transferable
credit are beginning to accomplish an important financing
function as an alternative to performance bonds and guaran-
tees. Since the authority and scope of national banks to issue
letters of credit have largely been resolved, the Bench and Bar
will become more familiar with letters of credit and more ac-
customed to their use. Indeed, this flexible financial device
may one day become as accepted among practitioners as guar-
antees and suretyships are now. All that remains is for the
ingenuity of the practitioner to devise new and different uses
for letters of credit.
David Richard Taggart
